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INTRODUCTION

Although women and people of color have been entering elite law
firms at an increasing rate, the most powerful and remunerative
positions still tend to be held by white men. A 1989 survey of the
nation's leading law firms found that over 90% of the partners were
men and more than 98% were white.' Similar patterns are found in
accounting firms,2 universities,3 and business corporations.4

1. See Rita HenleyJensen, Minorities Didn't Sharein Fim Growth, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19, 1990,
at 1 (finding that of 23,195 partners, 2139 (9.2%) were women; 210 (.9%) were black; 111
(.48%) were Hispanic; and 123 (.53%) were Asian American or Native American). See id. at 28.
2. See Theresa A. Hammond, The Socio-Economic Determinants of the Demographic
Composition of the Public Accounting Profession (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin, Madison) (on file with The American University Law Review).
3. See Richard H. Chused, The HiringandRetention ofMinoritiesand Women on American Law
School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537,538 (1988) (reporting that in 1986, 20% of full-time law
professors were female and 3.7% were black); Paula Dressel et al., The Dynamics of Homosocial
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The social science literature offers competing explanations for the
lack of integration in top-level professional jobs. Most of the debate
revolves around the relative importance of individual-level "supplyside" determinants (such as variations in individual qualifications),
versus structural or institutional "demand-side" determinants (such as
the distribution of employment opportunity).'
According to the supply-side explanation, the lack of integration in
top-level jobs primarily reflects a shortage of qualified women and
minority candidates.' According to the demand-side explanation, the
lack of integration in top-level jobs primarily reflects the persistence
institutionalization of
of employment discrimination and the
7
men.
white
favoring
criteria
advancement
This is an important debate within present policy context, because
it speaks to the need for continuing legal intervention into the
employment relationship. If gender- and race-based employment
inequality can be attributed to individual-level differences in skill or
experience, then employment discrimination can be located in the
past and continuing inequalities can be explained as its residue,' or
Reproduction in Academic Institutions, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 37, 40-43 (1994) (discussing
underrepresentation of female and minority professors in tenured and central administrative
positions within universities); Deborah J. Merritt et al., Family, Place, and Caree. The Gender
Paradoxin Law School Hiring,2WIS. L. REV. 395,398-411 (1993) (describing underrepresentation
of women among tenured professors at elite law schools).
4. See generally Richard L. Zweigenhaft, Minorities and Women of the Corporation: Will They
Attain Seats ofPower?, in POWER ELITEs AND ORGANIZATIONS (G. William Dumhoff& Thomas Dye
eds., 1987) (stating that white males tend to hold positions of upper management in corporations); The Glass Ceiling in Federal Agencies, A GAO Survey on Women and Minorities in Federal
Agencies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Gov'tal Affairs, 102d Cong. 75-77 (1991) (statement
of Bernard Ungar, Dir., Fed. Hum. Resource Mgmt. Issues, U.S. GAO.) (stating that women
and minorities are underrepresented in federal civilian workforce and constitute bulk of lowerlevel job grades and that white males tend to occupy upper level job grades).
5. See infra notes 45-70 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Solomon William Polachek, SexDifferences in College Major,31 INDus. & LAB. PEL
REV. 498,508 (1978) [hereinafter Polachek, CollegeMajor (linking occupational sex segregation
to sex differences in choice of college major); see also Solomon William Polachek, Occupational
Self-Selection: A Human CapitalApproach to Sex Difference in OccupationalStructure, 63 RExv. ECON.
STAT. 60, 68 (1981) [hereinafter Polachek, Human Capital (developing economic model of why
women in most societies pursue different occupations than men).
7. See, eg., Paula England, Occupational Segregation: Rejoinder to Polachek, 20 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 441, 442 (1985) (stating that occupational segregation occurs due to combination
of discrimination, structural factors, and gender role socialization); Barbara F. Reskin, Bringing
the Men Back In: Sex Differentiation andthe Devaluation of Women's Work, 2 GENDER & SOVY 58, 61
(1988); see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VI to Jobs in High Places,95 HARv. L. REV.
947, 948-49 (1982) (stating that legal efforts to combat discrimination in workplace have been
aimed largely at lower level jobs, resulting in relatively few blacks in elite professions).
8. See William L Corbett, Providing and Defending Employment DiscriminationClaims, 47
MONT. L. REv. 217, 218 (1986) (stating that supply-side argument is a defense for employers in
employment discrimination lawsuits). If there are not enough qualified candidates, then the
underrepresentation at issue can be attributed to past discrimination-and past employers-rather than to the practices of the defendant. See id.; see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 642-43 (1989) (holding that prima facie case of discrimination was not
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If variations in individual

qualifications cannot account for gender or race inequality, then
employers' practices remain suspect, and continuing legal intervention
may be justified."°
By focusing on the relative importance of "supply-side" versus
"demand-side" determinants, however, this debate ignores the role of
organizations in shaping both the supply of qualified workers and the
demand for workplace integration." Recent studies indicate that
employees' achievement levels and employers' propensity to discriminate may vary significantly across different organizational settings,
even controlling for variations in labor supply and demand.12

established despite statistical evidence that almost all low-paid workers were minorities and few
were in high-paying positions because of the possibility that minorities did not seek high-paid
jobs due to lack of interest); Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 674 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that
lingering effects of pre-Title VII racial discrimination are not actionable and plaintiff must
demonstrate that alleged employment discrimination is not merely vestige of past discrimination).
9. Employers have avoided liability in sex discrimination suits by arguing that women are
not interested in the position at issue. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264,
1305 (N.D. II1.1986), aftd, 839 F.2d 302,320-21 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that although EEOC's
statistical analysis demonstrated sex segregation among Sears' employees, court concluded that
statistics were not relevant because female employees were not as interested in certain jobs, such
as commission sales jobs, as males). The "lack of interest" argument assumes that women and
men prefer different kinds of work and that these preferences are unrelated to labor market
opportunities. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretationsof
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raisingthe Lack of InterestArgument, 103 HARV. L.

Ray. 1749, 1754 (1990). Similarly, some scholars attribute occupational segregation to women's
choices. See Polachek, College Major, supra note 6, at 508.

10. Some legal scholars argue that the persistence of gender- and race-based employment
inequality justifies the use of group-based, "structural" remedies such as quotas. See Bartholet,
supra note 7, at 958; David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. LJ. 1619, 1655-56 (1991) (proposing
institutional structures to address employment discrimination); see alsoROSABET MOSS KANTER,
MEN & WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 282 (1970) (calling for "batch" hiring of women into

traditionally male organizations to counter structural effects of tokenism).
11.

SeeJames N. Baron, OrganizationalPerspectiveson Stratification, 10 ANN. REv. Soc. 37, 47

(1984) (linking specific organizational structures, such as unions, to stratification outcomes);
James N. Baron & William T. Bielby, Bringing the Firms Back In: Stratification,Segmentation, and
the Organization of Work, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 737, 738 (1980) (examining structural explanations
for socioeconomic inequality); Ross M. Stolzenberg, Bringing the Boss Back In: Employer Size,
Employee Schooling, and Socioeconomic Achievement, 43 AM. SOC. REv. 813, 813-14 (1978) (finding

that effect of workers' educational level on earnings and socioeconomic status increases
logarithmically as function of size of their employer).
12. See, eg., Paul D. Allison &J. Scott Long, DepartmentalEffects on Scientific Productivity, 55
AM. Soc. REv. 469,469-70 (1990) (finding that effect of departmental affiliation on productivity
is more important than effect of productivity on departmental affiliation); James N. Baron &
Andrew E. Newman, For What It's Worth: Organizations,Occupations, and the Value of Work, 55 AM.

Soc. Ray. 155, 157 (1990) [hereinafter Baron &Newman, ForWhat It's Worth] (finding that work
done disproportionately by non-whites and women is devalued most in job categories that are
traditional, non-unionized, and have ambiguous performance criteria); James N. Baron &
Andrew E. Newman, Pay the Man: Effects ofDemographic Composition on PrescribedWage Rates in the
California Civil Serice, in PAY EQUTrry: EMPIRICAL INQUIRIES 107, 125-26 (Robert T. Michael et

al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Baron & Newman, Pay the Man].
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Organizational characteristics also may affect employers' responses to
antidiscrimination law."3
These studies suggest that organizations may play a critical role in
"mediating" both supply-side and demand-side sources of employment
inequality: "ITlhe organizational ,context... is critical, not simply
because organizations mediate-and sometimes depart from-market
forces, but also because organizational policies and practices often
help define the relevant 'market' in the first place." 4
This study investigates the effects of organizational characteristics
on the process of gender and race integration within law firms. I
focus on the effects of "structural" characteristics (such as size,
bureaucratization, promotion structure, and geographic structure), as
well as "practice" characteristics (such as the nature of the firm's
client base). The purpose of the study is to identify law firm
characteristics that lead to increased gender and race integration.
I build on an emerging "organizational" perspective in the social
science literature that emphasizes the importance of organizational
conditions in accounting for patterns of gender and race stratification. 5
However, whereas most previous studies examine how
organizational conditions affect wage inequality
or individual
7
productivity, I examine how organizational conditions affect the
process of organizational integration.8
In addition, whereas

13. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: OrganizationalMediation
of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM.J. SOC. 1531, 1567-69 (1992) [hereinafter Edelman, Symbolic Structures]
(finding that organizational characteristics such as size and proximity to public sphere affect
both rate and type of organizational response); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and
OrganizationalGovernance: The Expansion of Due Process in the AmericanWorkplace, 95 AM.J. SOC.
1401, 1435-36 (1990) [hereinafter Edelman, Legal Environments].
14. Baron & Newman, For What It's Worth, supra note 12, at 173; see also Edelman, Symbolic
Structures,supra note 13, at 1532 (discussing organizational "mediation" of Equal Employment
Opportunity law).
15. See generallyJames N. Baron et al., The Structure of Opportunity: How Promotion Ladders
Vary Within andAmong Organizations,31 ADMIN. So. Q. 248, 271-72 (1986) (relating characteristics ofjobs and organizations to structure of internal promotion ladders); Baron, supra note 11,
at 47-53 (linking specific organizational structures to stratification outcomes); Baron & Bielby,
supranote 11, at 738 (examining structural explanations for socioeconomic inequality); Jeffrey
Pfeffer, Towardan Examination ofStratflcationin Organizations,22 ADMIN. Sot. Q.553,566 (1977);
Stolzenberg, supra note 11, at 825-26 (discussing relationship between establishment size and
effects of schooling on occupational status and earnings).
16. See e.g., Baron & Newman, For What It's Worth, supranote 12, at 157; William P. Bridges
& Robert L. Nelson, Markets in Hierarchies: Organizationaland Market Influences on Gender
Inequality in a State Pay System, 95 AM. J. SoC. 616, 617 (1989); Jo Dixon & Carroll Seron,
Stratificationin the Legal Profession: Se, Sector, and Salary, 29 L. & Socy REv. 381,404 (1995).
17. See, e.g., Allison & Long, supra note 12, at 469-70.
18. For a study that took a similar approach, seeJames N. Baron et al., Targets ofOpportunity:
Organizationaland
EnvironmentalDeterminantsof GenderIntegrationWithin the CaliforniaCivil Service,
1979-1985,96 AM.J. Soc. 1362, 1362 (1991) (analyzing effect of organizational dynamics on rate
of gender integration within California Civil Service).
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previous studies focus on either gender19 or race," I examine both
gender and race, and I compare the effects of law firm characteristics
on the2 representation of lawyers from different demographic
groups. 1
A.

Research Setting

My analysis is based on annual (1980-90) employment data for a
sample of ninety-seven elite law firms. "Elite" law firms are large
urban law firms that serve national and multinational corporations.22
These law firms pay the highest starting salaries of all legal employers
and have a reputation for providing the best lawyers with complex
and challenging work.23 Senior partners in such firms tend to enjoy
a great deal of professional and political influence: they run local
and national bar associations; they sit on legislative drafting committees; and they occupy positions on the executive boards of client
corporations.24
Their privileged and highly visible position makes elite law firms an
important arena for studying gender and race integration.2 5 Al-

19. See, e.g., KANTER, supra note 10, at 15-28 (studying role of men and women in
administration of corporations); Baron et al., supra note 18, at 1362 (linking organizational
change to social inequality and gender integration); Bridges & Nelson, supra note 16, at 617
(examining organizational influences on gender inequality); Dixon & Seron, supra note 16, at

381-83 (demonstrating effects of human and social capital on income of male and female
attorneys); Jeffrey Pfeffer & Alison Davis-Blake, The Effect of the Proportion of Women on Salaries:
The Case of College Administrators,32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 1 (1987) (examining effect of proportion

of women administrators on salaries of both men and women in administrative positions in
colleges and universities).
20. SeegeneraliyHammond, supranote 2 (analyzing determinants of racial integration within
accounting profession).
21. I perform separate analyses for female, black, Hispanic, and Asian American lawyers.
My analysis focused on these four groups because these are the categories used on the NALP
survey form. Unfortunately, the data do not allow for the examination of interactions between
gender and race, because raw figures for law firm composition are not broken down by gender
within different racial categories. Data for the legal profession as a whole indicate that a higher
proportion of minority than white lawyers are women-31% versus 13%. See RICHARD L. ABEL,
AMERICAN LAWYERS 102 (1989). In 1984, women represented a higher proportion of all minority
professionals than of white professionals. See Andrew Hacker, Women vs. Men in the Workforce,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 124.
22. See generally Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The
Promotion-to-PartnersTournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REv. 747, 756-65

(1990) (discussing development and characteristics of large law firms).
23. See id. at 747. See generally ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988) (exploring patterns of organizational change

in large law firms).
24. See Terrence C. Halliday & Charles L. Cappell, Indicators of Democracy in Professional
Associations: EliteRecruitment, Turnover, and Decision Making in a MetropolitanBar Association, AM.

B. FouND. Rzs. J. 697, 758-62 (1979) (considering political structure of bar associations).
25. See Robert L Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional
Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACFICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 177, 192-98 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
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though urban law firms employ only a small fraction of all lawyers,26
in the
these law firms dominate the market for private legal services
28
United States,27 and their relative market share is increasing.
Moreover, the institutional significance of elite law firms far exceeds
the number of lawyers they employ. In many respects elite law firms
serve as the bellwether of the profession," institutionalizing styles of
recruitment, training, and work organization that are emulated by
other law firms in the United States and abroad. 0 Some argue that
the interests of elite law firms dominate legal education and professional socialization.8 '
Finally, from the standpoint of research design, elite law firms
present a timely context for comparative organizational research.
Large, urban law firms have been a central arena for many recent
changes affecting the legal profession as a whole, including rapid
growth, increased competition, changes in work organization, and
increasing demographic diversity among lawyers.3 2 However, these

26. In 1980, 68% of all lawyers were in private practice. Only 7.3% of these lawyers worked
in firms of 50 lawyers or more (5% of the total lawyer population). See BARBARA A. CURRAN ET
AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 13-14 (1985). In 1991, 72.9% of all lawyers were in private
practice, and 78% of all lawyers under the age of 40 were in private practice. Of all lawyers
engaged in private practice in 1991, 12.6% worked in law firms of 101 lawyers or more. See
BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 24-25 (1994).
27. See NELSON, supranote 23, at 270-72.
28. SeeMARO GALANTER &THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE BIG IAW FIRM 40-41 (1991); Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There
So Many Lanyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 431, 435-40 (1989).
29. See NELSON, supranote 23, at 270-90.
30. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 28, at 18-19.
31.

See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY.

A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983); Stephen C. Hapern, On the Politics andPathology ofLegal
Education, 32J. LEGAL EDUC. 383, 389-90 (1982); Karl E. Klare, The Law School Curriculum in the
1980s: What's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336, 338-39 (1982). Some socio-legal scholars have
criticized research on elite law firms, especially in the context of gender stratification, because
this focus "accepts and assimilates to conventional sociological and popular cultural notions of
what is important." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploringa Research Agenda on the Feminizationof the
Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 289, 307 (1989).
Menkel-Meadow argues that women lawyers may not necessarily adopt the "monetary and
prestige" criteria for success put forth by "conventional male-constructed sociology." Id. This
point is well-taken; the desirability of working in an elite law firm could be disputed on a
number of grounds. However, to assume that women are less interested than men in holding
lucrative and prestigious jobs is extremely problematic. See Schultz, supra note 9, at 1754.
Furthermore, whatever position one takes as to the desirability of their institutional influence,
as a practical matter, elite law firms play a central role in intraprofessional stratification. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra at 304-12.
32. See Sander & Williams, supra note 28, at 478. Sander and Williams note:
Large, elite law firms... have been critical catalysts of many recent changes. Nowhere
has the growing demand for legal services been as great as among the customers of
elite firms. Nowhere have the changes in the organization of legal work been so
fundamental. And the trend of increasing concentration of legal work in large firms
... seems to be accelerating.
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changes have been "partial and conflictual,""3 as firm leaders and
factions within firms grapple with various strategies for adapting to
change.
As a result, significant firm-level variations in the structural and
34
cultural conditions for individual advancement presently exist.
Understanding these conditions and their effects on law firm
demographics could provide important insights into the dynamics of
law firm integration and the role of firm-level processes in accounting
for market- or profession-wide employment patterns.
B. Data and Research Design
Data for the sample firms are drawn primarily from The Directory of
Legal Employers, published each year by the National Association for
Law Placement ("NALP") . The population from which the sample
was drawn consists of all the private law firms listed in the NALP
Directory from 1980 through 1990, whose principal locations are
Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, or Washington, D.C.
(n=540).36 Within each city, "elite" firms were selected on the basis
of starting salary for associates. Starting salaries were measured at
three time points (1981, 1985, and 1990)," 7 and the top-paying firms
in each city were identified (n=161). 38 Fifty-six firms with fewer than
six entries over the eleven year period were dropped, as were eight
specialty firms. 9
The final sample covers ninety-seven firms:

NELSON, supra note 23, at 288.
34. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
35. The NALP Directory includes more than 1000 legal employers including private law
firms, public interest organizations, government employers, and corporations. Entries providing
descriptive information about the type of employer, the nature of the practice, and the size,
structure, and demographic composition of the workplace are submitted by employers in early
spring of each year. The NALP directory is used primarily by law school placement offices. See
NATIONAL ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, DIRECrORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS (1990) [hereinafter
NALP DIRECrORY].
36. For sampling purposes, each firm was assigned one principal location: the location of
the firm headquarters if one were designated or the location of the oldest or largest office when
no "headquarters" was designated. For example, a New York-based firm with offices in Los
Angeles and Washington, D.C., was counted only once, as a NewYork firm. In most cases, when
the firm named a headquarters, the headquarters was the oldest and largest office maintained
by the firm.
37. The measure was based on the starting salary that firms reported for the previous year,
rather than the projected salary for the following fall. As a result, the salaries upon which firms
were selected were the starting salaries paid in 1980, 1984, and 1989, but reported in the 1981,
1985, and 1990 Directory listings.
38. Firms were selected if the starting salary paid to associates was at or above the city
median at all three time points or if the combined salary for all three time points vras above the
combined median for that city. These criteria yielded roughly the top-paying 30% of all firms
in the population (161 of 540 firms).
39. Specialty (or "boutique") firms are furms offering legal services in one primary area of
law (such as tax or patent law). Specialty firms were dropped from the sample because initial

33.
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nineteen in Chicago; twenty-two in Los Angeles; thirty-nine in New
York City; and seventeen in Washington, D.C.'
I sampled on the basis of location and starting salary41 in order to
minimize unmeasured variation in firms' labor supply at the entry
level. It is impossible to measure directly the relative qualifications of
law firm applicants, or the pool of potential applicants for any given
firm. However, law firm recruitment is highly competitive. Within
most large cities, there is a cluster of top-paying law firms whose entrylevel salaries move together over time. Therefore, I assume that
within a given city, the top-paying law firms operate within the same
external labor market. 2
Parts of the quantitative analysis are supplemented by interviews
with elite firm lawyers conducted between 1989 and 1992.' 3 The
interviews focused on various issues related to the organization of
work and careers in elite law firms and the nature of advancement
opportunities for women and minority lawyers. Respondents were
selected to provide gender and racial diversity, as well as regional
variation and variation in employment status (junior associate, senior
associate, partner, managing partner). Direct quotes are referenced
in the text according to the race, gender, and position of the
respondent.44
Part I of this Article explains the theoretical context of my research
and defines the questions that the study will address. The central

examination revealed that they tend to recruit from a different external labor supply than

"general practice" firms.
40. See Appendix, infra pp. 745-46, for a list of firms in the sample.
41. Size serves as the most common benchmark for identifying "elite" law firms. See
NELSON, supranote 23, at 1 (describing large firms' significant influence over legal issues); Marc
Gaanter & Thomas Palay, The Transformation of the Big Law Firm, in LAWxyERS' IDEALS AND

LAWYERs' PRACrICES: TRANSFORMATIONS INTHE.AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, 31,52-53 (Robert
L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (noting large law firms' reputation for quality). However, the firms
sampled on the basis of salary also are among the nation's largest. Seventy-six percent (74) of
the firms in the sample ranked among the 250 largest law firms in the nation in 1989. See
Appendix, infra pp. 745-46.
42. Because most elite law firms recruit nationally as well as regionally, the relevant labor
market is partly a national one. However, to the extent that the elite firm labor market is a
national labor market, it is dominated by the four cities included in the sample. In 1980, these
four cities had the largest lawyer populations, private practice populations, and law firm
populations in the country. See CURRAN, supra note 26, at 579-83. The 1980 rankings for
number of law firms were: (1) New York City (1790 firms); (2) Chicago (974 firms); (3) Los
Angeles (838 firms); and (4) Washington, D.C. (823 finns). See id. at 267, 320, 560, 567.
43. The respondents do not necessarily represent the same law firms included in the
sample. There were a total of 26 respondents, three of whom were interviewed twice. Of the
26 lawyers interviewed, 14 represented firms that are included in the sample. Most of the
interviews occurred in a group setting, with other lawyers and researchers participating.
44. For instance, a white male partner is represented as "WMP;" a black female associate
as "BFA." When more than one respondent from a category is quoted, each is given a unique
number ("WMP1," "WMP2"). All interview transcripts are on file with the author.
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question is: Why are some elite law firms more integrated than
others?
Part II establishes the empirical context for the analysis: How much
do elite law firms vary in the gender and race composition of lawyers?
To what extent are firm-level differences determined by variations in
the external labor supply or by other labor market determinants such
as geographic location, starting salary, or the firm's demand for labor
in general (measured by firm growth)?
Part III analyzes the effects of various organizational characteristics
on the gender and race composition of the sample firms. Controlling
for labor supply and demand, to what extent do finn-level characteristics affect the level of law firm integration? Which characteristics are
most important? Are their effects the same at different levels of the
law firm hierarchy? Are they the same for different demographic
groups?
I summarize my findings in Part IV and discuss their implications.
My main findings are: (1) that firm-level characteristics significantly
affect the level of law firm integration, even controlling for variations
in labor supply and demand; and (2) that the determinants of law
firm integration are significantly different for different demographic
groups. These different predictors of group representation suggest
different underlying mechanisms for change. I conclude by discussing
the implications of this argument for theoretical debates about
employment inequality, as well as for the future of gender and race
integration within law firms.

I. THEoRETIcAL CONTEXT
The social science literature on employment inequality traditionally
has been dominated by a debate between functionalist "supply-side"
theory, which suggests that individual attributes are the primary
determinants of employment outcomes, and "demand-side" critiques
of functionalism, which emphasize the importance of social, structural, and institutional determinants. The central issues in this debate
are: (1) how much employment inequality can be attributed to
individualversusstructuralcauses; and (2) whether present inequalities
ultimately are self-correcting or self-perpetuating.
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The Supply-Side Model: IndividualAttainment

The supply-side model stems from human capital theory in
economics and status attainment theory in sociology.' This model
conceptualizes economic advancement as an individual attainment
process: Individuals invest in and accumulate human capital assets
such as education and work experience; these assets then determine
employment outcomes, such as occupation, position, and wage. 6
The supply-side model assumes that employers and other evaluators
are economically rational. That is, it assumes a competitive labor
market, good information, and the use of performance-based (or
productivity-based) evaluative criteria.4 7 The supply-side model also
assumes economic rationality on the part of individuals investing in
attainment. It treats individuals' employment aspirations as exogenous to the labor market, and it assumes that individuals' human
capital investments are rational choices intended to maximize
earnings over time.'
These assumptions of economic rationality rest in turn on a
functionalist theory of employment stratification which holds that in
order to adapt and survive, societies must promote a meritocratic
matching of employees to jobs.4 9 Functionalist theory assumes that
there is some basis for consensus about which jobs are most important
and about which behaviors constitute good performance. That is, it
assumes that there is societal consensus about what constitutes
"economic rationality.""
According to the supply-side model, gender- and race-based
employment inequalities result primarily from individual-level
differences in choice, education, and effort. Supply-side proponents

45.

See Margaret Mooney Marini, Sex Difference in Earningsin the United States, 15 ANN. REV.
(reviewing "supply-side" explanations for low female wages). See generally
Paula England & Dana Dunn, Evaluating Work and Comparable Worth, 14 ANN. REV. Soc. 227
(1988) (reviewing economic and sociological theories of inequality).
46. Seegeneraly GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPrrAL (2d ed. 1975) (analyzing economic effects
of continuing education); JACOB MINCER, SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE AND EARNINGS (1974)
(analyzing economic effects of both education and work experience).
47. See E.M. Beck et al., Stratifcation in a Dual Economy: A Sectoral Model of Earnings
Determination, 43 Am. SOC. REv. 704 (1978) (summarizing "supply-side" theorists' analytical
framework); Patrick M. Horan, Is Status Attainment Research Atheoretical., 43 Am. Soc. REv. 534,
538-39 (1978) (discussing assumptions underlying "supply-side" theories of attainment).
48. See Polachek, College Major,supranote 6, at 500-01 (discussing male and female choices
of college major as individual rational choices); Polachek, Human Capita supranote 6, at 60-61

Soc. 343,348-58 (1989)

(analyzing occupational segregation by sex).
49. See Kingsley Davis& Wilbert E. Moore, Some Principlesof Stratification,10 Am. SOC. REV.
242, 242-43 (1945) (introducing functionalist theory of stratification).
50. See England & Dunn, supra note 45, at 241-43 (criticizing functionalist assumptions of
.rationality").

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:669

do not deny the existence of structural constraints: as an empirical
matter, researchers acknowledge the potential for employer bias,
occupational sex segregation, and other factors that interfere with the
meritocratic matching of employees to jobs.51 As an analytical
matter, however, the supply-side model brackets these constraints,
treating them as temporary distortions that will be corrected through
the operation of market forces. Thus, the supply-side model predicts
progressive gender and race integration at all levels of employment:
[T]he human capital framework ... holds that discrimination

(ascriptive criteria) will be eroded by the competitive operation of
the marketplace because discrimination is held to cost those who
discriminate.

...

[T]he human capital model also predicts the

decline of voluntary segregation that may result from women's
choices. Increasing wages lead more women into the labor force
for longer spells which in turn leads them to invest more heavily in
labor market skills which in turn should reduce the sexual
differentiation of occupational choices.52
B.

The Demand-Side Model: Structural Constraints

The demand-side model emphasizes the structural constraints on
individual attainment. According to the demand-side argument,
individual employment outcomes cannot be understood apart from
structural conditions affecting labor market competition and the
distribution of advancement opportunities across industries, organizations, and jobs. 3 Because of its emphasis on opportunity structures,

51. See generaUy Robert M. Hauser, On "Stratificationin a DualEconomy : Comment on Beck et
al, 45 AM. Soc. REv. 702 (1980) (acknowledging existence of structural variations but rejecting
importance of structural variables in accounting for gender- and race-based wage inequality).
52. Jerry A. Jacobs, Long-Term Trends in OccupationalSegregation by Sex, 95 AM. J. SOC. 160,
161 (1989) (citations omitted).
53. See generallyRobert P. Althauser & Arne L. Kalleberg, Firms, Occupations and the Structure
of Labor Markets, in SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVEs ON LABOR MARKETS 119 (Ivar Berg ed., 1981)
supra
(positing that internal labor markets act independently of economic sectors); Baron et al.,
note 18, at 270 (concluding that political and organizational forces both within and without
firms shape promotion and hiring policy); Beck et al., supra note 47, at 706-08 (describing "dual
economy" theories to explain wage differences in labor force); Robert Bibb & William H. Form,
The Effects of Industria Occupationaland See Stratficationon Wages in Blue CollarMarkets, 55 SoC.
FORCES 974 (1977) (proposing that traditional human capital economic theory inadequately
explains unequal wages for female workers and embracing "demand-side" model); Paula
England, The Failure of Human Capital Theory to Explain Occupational Sex Segregation, 17 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 358, 369 (1982) (rejecting Polachek's theory that intermittent employment reduces
women's wages); George Farkas et al., StructuralEffects on Wages, in INDUSTEs, FIRMS AND JOBS
93 (George Farkas & Paula England eds., 1988) (analyzing how structural characteristics of
businesses interact with employees' bargaining power to affect wages); Randy Hodson & Paula
England, IndustrialStructure and Sex Differences in Earnings, 25 INDUS. REL. 16 (1986) (assessing
impact of industrial characteristics on wage gap between men and women); Patricia A. Roos &
Barbara F. Reskin, InstitutionalFactors Contributing to Sex Segregation in the Workplace, in SEX
SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, REMEDIES 235 (Barbara F. Reskin ed.,
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this line of argument is called the "structuralist" (or "new
structuralist") perspective."
The structuralist perspective challenges assumptions of economic
rationality5 5 and the functionalist theory of stratification that underlies them.56 Structuralist writers have been particularly critical of
their assumption of economic rationality on the part of employers.
For instance, although competition may encourage employer
"rationality" and the use of performance-based criteria,5 7 critics argue
that large segments of the labor force are isolated from competition
because they work in internal labor markets" or bureaucratic
personnel systems 9 where wages and evaluative criteria are institutionally determined.' Evidence suggests that women and minorities
have unequal access to internal labor markets6' and that bureaucratic pay scales favor jobs held by white men.62

1984) (discussing formal barriers to women's employment in predominantly male jobs);
Stolzenberg, supra note 11 (analyzing characteristics of both employers and employees to
understand wage differences).
54. Baron and Bielby introduced this label. See Baron & Bielby, supranote 11, at 737 (using
term "new structuralism" to describe emerging stratification research focusing on structure over
individual characteristics).
55. See Beck et al., supra note 47, at 708 (asserting importance of considering not only
individual factors but also variables in economic sector); Horan, supra note 47, at538-39 (noting
that basic theoretical assumption that employers act rationally colors conclusions derived from
research).
56. See England & Dunn, supra note 45, at 238-39 (noting that functionalist theory, which
predicts greatest financial rewards for most functionally significant jobs, cannot explain lower
salaries for women who are in same functionally significant jobs as men).
57. SeeArmen A. Alchian &Reuben A. Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and thePursuitofMoney,
in ASPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 156, 174-75 (H. Gregg Lewis ed., 1962) (suggesting that
competition counteracts movement toward labor market conformity and provides disincentive
to discrimination); DonaldJ. Cymrot, Does Competition Lessen Discrimination?Some Evidence 20J.
HuM. RESOURCES 605, 611 (1985) ("Competition may be a more effective tool for lessening or
eliminating discrimination than a legislative or judicial edict.").
58. SeePETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAELJ. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER
ANALYSIS 32-34 (1971) (noting that acts to increase security in internal labor market also result
in limiting access to external competition). See generallyAlthauser & Kafleberg, supra note 53,
at 124-28 (redefining internal labor markets to account for variations in traditional model).
59. See Sanford M.Jacoby, TheDeuelopmentoflnternal LaborMarketsin American Manufacturing
Firms, in INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 23-30 (Paul Osterman ed., 1984) (describing gradual
development of personnel bureaucracy at expense of foreman's ability to influence wages).
60. SeeBridges & Nelson, supranote 16, at 617-18 (rejecting efficiency models because such
models cannot adequately explain institutional influences on lower pay rates for "female"jobs).
61.

See DAVID L. FEATHERMAN & ROBERT M. HAUSER, OPPORTUNITY AND CHANGE 429-544

(1978) (analyzing ethnic minorities' access to labor market); Willian H. Sewell et al., Sex,
Schooling and OccupationalStatus, 86 AM. J. Soc. 551, 579-80 (1980) (concluding that segregation by sex in workplace limits women's access to higher-payingjobs and does not limit men's
access to jobs).
62. See, ag., Baron & Newman, Pay the Man, supranote 12, at 125-26 (evaluating wage data
indicating significantly lower wages injobs containing large numbers ofwomen and minorities);
Paula England et al., ExplainingOccupationalSex Segregationand Wages: Findingsfrom a Model with
FKxed Effects, 53 AM. Soc. REv. 544, 555 (1988) (arguing that economic incentives to avoid
turnover also reduce incentives to hire women); Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, supra note 19, at 20-22
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Furthermore, even within a competitive market, employers and
other evaluators may lack information about employees' abilities and
potential.63 Some critics suggest that a lack of information benefits
employees from the already-dominant group. Because employers
know more about the abilities of white male workers-or at least
believe they know more'--they may hesitate to hire and promote
members of other groups, regardless of their apparent qualifications.
Thus, a lack of information may produce "statistical discrimination."'
Finally, some critics challenge the rationality of the evaluative
criteria themselves. These critics argue that, especially in professional
and managerial jobs, where performance criteria are subjective and
uncertain, employers tend to fall back on social bases for trust; that
is, ascriptive criteria such as gender, race, and social class. 66 As a
and occupational elites
result, homogeneity among organizational
7
self-reproducing.
be
to
tends
Based on these critiques, structuralist writers challenge individualistic explanations for gender- and race-based employment inequality.
According to the structuralist account, gender- and race-based
employment inequalities primarily reflect extra-individual causes, such
as the persistence of employment discrimination and the institutionalization of labor markets favoring white men.'
Structuralist writers also challenge the supply-side prediction of
progressive integration. The structuralist perspective suggests that
rather than being corrected through market forces, gender- and race(concluding thatjobs employing large proportion of women tend to pay lower wages).
63.

SeeJames C. March &James G. March, PerformanceSampling in Social Matches, 23 ADMIN.

Sci.Q. 434,450 (1978) (proposing that performance evaluation relies on imperfect information
gathered through observation).
64. See KANTER, supranote 10, at 58-59 (describing how social similarity helps compensate
for other sources of uncertainty that managers face).
65. See generallyDennisj. Aigner & Glenn G. Cain, StatisticalTheories ofDiscriminationin Labor
Markets, 30 INDUS. LAB. REL. REv. 175 (1977) (interpreting theories of economic statistical
discrimination to explain race and sex discrimination in wages); ShellyJ. Lundberg & Richard
Startz, PrivateDiscriminationand SocialInterventionin Competitive LaborMarkets, 73 AM. ECON.REV.

340, 346 (1983) (recognizing correlation between lack of information and economic
discrimination).
66. See KANTER, supranote 10, at 52-54 (discussing corporations' preference for promoting
employees on basis of "social homogeneity"); see also Ellen R. Auster & Robert Drazin, Sex
Inequality at Higher Levels in the Hierarchy, 58 SOC. INQUIRY 216, 226 (1988) (suggesting that

employers' reliance on ascriptive characteristics increases the status of the job); Baron &
Newman, For What It's Worth, supra note 12, at 172 (finding lower wages for women and
minorities, particularly for jobs without specific evaluative criteria); Bartholet, supra note 7, at
955-59 (calling for increased regulation of professional employment decisions under Title VII).
67. See KANTER, supra note 10, at 52-54 (noting direct correlation between lack of
information and promotions based on "social similarity"); Dressel et al., supra note 3, at 40-43
(discussing problem of "homosocial reproduction" in academia).
68. See generally England, supra note 53, at 367; Reskin, supra note 7.
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based employment inequality tends to be structurally self-perpetuating.69 "From our view, the different experiences of females and blacks
... are not anomalies but regularities which can be better understood
by focusing on social and economic structure .. .
C. The Limits of the "Structuralist"Critique
Structuralist arguments are an important antidote to the individualism of the supply-side model. Structural sources of employment
inequality may be particularly important in the context of the
professions in which competition is restricted7" and evaluative criteria
are subjective and uncertain.72
However, although structuralist theory has challenged the relative
importance of individual-level determinants, it has not directly
challenged the supply-side conception of individual attainment73 or
Instead, structuralist research
offered an alternative theory.74
primarily focuses on what the supply-side model leaves out. In most
research, the supply-side model provides the analytical (and methodological) starting point: How much inequality can individual-level
variables explain? Structuralist arguments are built around the
variation left unexplained.75
69. See Beck et al., supranote 47, at 708-09 (describing race and sex as variables indicating
lower economic opportunities); Roos & Reskin, supra note 53, at 250-52 (detailing structural
barriers to promoting women such as biased job ladders and informal networks).
70. Beck et al., supranote 47, at 713.
71. SeeABEL, supranote 21, at 112-26 (describing how legal profession defends its monopoly
against lay competitors); Arne L. Kalleberg et al., Economic Segmentation, WorkerPower, and Income

Inequality, 87 AM.J. Soc. 651, 659 (1981) (comparing professions to other types ofjobs).
72. SeeAuster & Drazin, supra note 66, at 218-19 (linking sex bias to evaluative uncertainty
resulting in wage discrimination).
73.

See generally Michael R. Smith, What's New in "New Structuralist"AnalysesofEarnings?, 55

AM. Soc. REv. 827 (1990) (rejecting "structuralist" analysis as inadequate); RonnieJ. Steinberg,
Sodal Construction ofSki, 17 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 449, 476-77 (1990) (urging development
of "structural" conception of skill).
74. See Baron & Bielby, supra note 11, at 737 ("Unfortunately, the 'new structuralists' have
yet to offer a coherent and consistent representation of the structurally contingent nature of
attainment processes.").
75. For instance, the typical strategy for measuring "demand-side" discrimination is to
establish separate wage equations for men and women (or for whites and blacks) and then to
apply each group's coefficients to the other group's attainment variables. For a review of this
approach, see Marini, supra note 45, at 348-58. To the extent that women could earn men's
wages with men's qualifications, wage differentials are attributed to variations in qualifications.
To the extent that unexplained variations remain, it is interpreted as a measure of discrimination effects. For a more sophisticated description of this technique, see Randall W. Eberts &Joe
A. Stone, Mal-Female Differences in Promotions: EEO in Public Education, 20 J. HUM. RESOURCES
504,506-07 (1985); Solomon W. Polachek, DiscontinuousLaborForceParticipationand Its Effects on
Women's Market Earnings,in SEX, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 108-11 (Cynthia

B. Lloyd ed., 1975). A similar strategy guides research on the impact of federal
antidiscrimination policy, except that impact studies focus on changes in the level of
unexplained variation before and after the imposition of Title VII or related legislation. If Title
VII can be shown to have reduced unexplained variation (in wage levels, promotion rates,
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In this context, the structuralist account essentially becomes a series
of caveats to supply-side attainment theory. Supply-side writers
emphasize the importance of individual attainment; "demand-side"
writers emphasize structural constraints on attainment. In analyzing
gender and race inequality, supply-side writers cite the progress that
has been made; demand-side writers stress the barriers that remain.
The problem is not with structuralist theory, as some have suggested.76 The problem is that a "structural" theory of attainment cannot
be developed within the supply-side/demand-side research paradigm.
The supply-side/demand-side dichotomy treats individual attainment
as prior to, and relatively independent of, labor market conditions.
That is, individual attainment is treated as an input.
Whether critical of functionalist theory or human capital theory,
the dozens of studies on wage determination processes accepted as
unproblematic that skill differences among individuals were observable and objectively measurable ....
[B]oth general studies of
wage determination and more recent studies of wage differentials
by gender and race continued to rely on simple, individual-level
measures of skill,
even as they introduced other structural variables
77
into equations.
The most provocative aspect of structuralist theory is that it rejects
this positivist concept of attainment.78 Structuralist theory suggests
that individual attainment is, to some significant extent, structurally
contingent. It is constructed and reconstructed over time within
79
concrete social, structural, and institutional contexts.
Structuralist theory therefore requires a dynamic concept of
attainment. For structuralist theory, the relevant question is not how
much individual attainment matters, but rather, how is individual
attainment constructed? That is, under what conditions are gender and

employment shares, etc.), the implication is that the legislation was effective, in that
discrimination contributed to the original disparity. See, e.g., Andrea H. Belier, The Impact of
EqualOpportunity Policy on Sex Differentialsin Earningsand Occupations,in PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NINETY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 72 Am.
ECON. REv. 171, 172-73 (1982) (relying on this indirect measure of discrimination).
76. See Smith, supra note 73, at 827.
77. Steinberg, supranote 73, at 451.
78. SeeElizabeth Chambliss, New Parmers with Power? Organizational Determinants of Law
Firm Integration 30-33 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, on file with The American University Law Review).
79. See id. at 33; see also Marc Granovetter, Toward a Sociological Theory of Income Differences,
in SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTrEs ON LABOR MARXETs 29 (Ivar Berg ed., 1981) ("It seems likely that
occupations and industries vary systematically in the social structure of work groups ....In any
comparison of occupational or industrial groups, this should account for part of the wage
variation.").
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race inequalities more or less likely to be alleviated?8" "While the
[structuralist] emphasis on continuity [of inequality] has been an
important strength, the structuralist perspective should attempt to
identify conditions under which the degree of sex segregation would
be expected to change."8
D.

The OrganizationalPerspective

The "organizational" 82 perspective represents an effort to reorient
the structuralist research agenda. Rather than focusing on the
relative importance of "supply-side" versus "demand-side" variables,
the organizational perspective focuses on the interactionof supply and
demand within particular organizational contexts. And rather than
focusing on the structural perpetuation of gender- and race-based
employment inequality, the organizational perspective examines
variations in organizational inequality and the sources of these
variations.
By focusing on the interaction of supply and demand, the organizational perspective provides an alternative to the positivist conception
of attainment. Rather than viewing individual attributes as preexisting and determining, the organizational perspective treats
individual attributes as themselves the product of an interaction (or
interactions) between individuals and organizations. Thus, rather
than asking "how much does individual attainment matter," the
organizational perspective asks "how do organizations construct
83
individual attainment."
Further, by focusing on variationsin organizational inequality, the
organizational perspective provides the basis for a "structuralist"
theory of change. Like the structuralist perspective, the organization-

80. See Baron et al., supranote 18, at 1364, 1397; Granovetter, supranote 79, at 11, 14, 33,
36, 37; Chambliss, supranote 78, at 33.
81. Jacobs, supranote 52, at 172.
82. "Organizational" is my label. Baron, who is the leading proponent of what Iam calling
the "organizational" approach, rejects this label because he regards it as advertising a unified
.organizational" theory of employment inequality. See Baron et al., supra note 18, at 1365.
Organizational theories such as population ecology, resource dependence and
institutionalization are typically portrayed as distinct or mutually exclusive paradigms.
However, they often focus on different organizational phenomena.., so it is often not
clear to what extent they represent rival perspectives .... Accordingly, rather than
develop a single, stylized 'organizational theory' of gender integration, we draw instead
on multiple perspectives ....
Id I use this label more generically to distinguish the perspective I am articulating from the
traditional "structuralist" perspective, which for the most part does not focus on organizationlevel processes.
83. See Baron, supra note 11, at 57-59 ("When job attributes evolve around [high status,
powerful, or senior employees], career outcomes depend on the idiosyncratic relations between
the worker and the organization ....").
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al perspective emphasizes the importance of "demand-side" determinants of employment inequality. However, unlike the traditional
structuralist account, the organizational perspective does not view the
influence of these environmental conditions as monolithic or static.
Instead, the organizational perspective emphasizes the relative
autonomy of organizations from their economic and institutional
environments, and the role of organizations in constructing these
environments. Thus, rather than asking why organizations are not
more integrated, the organizational perspective asks: Why are some
organizations more integrated than others?
1.

The interaction of supply and demand

Individual attainment depends on three types of influences:
individual attributes, structural attributes, and the process by which
individual and structure are "matched."'" Whereas the supplyside/demand-side debate focuses on the relative importance of
individual versus structural attributes, the organizational perspective
focuses on the process by which individual and structure are matched.
The organizational perspective views economic organizations as the
central arenas within which this matching process occurs:
Empirical associations between structure and attainment can be
explained only by attending to organizational arrangements within
firms .... Firms link the "macro" and "micro" dimensions of work
organization and inequality. Within firms, labor is priced and
allocated, techniques of production are arranged and implemented,
and power is organized and executed. Social and economic
mobility are achieved within and between economic organizations.8
Thus, according to the organizational perspective, organizations
should be the central unit of analysis in "structuralist" research.
"Comparative organizational research is essential if we are to
understand opportunity structures and the processes through which
workers and jobs are matched ....86
2.

The organizationalconstruction of supply and demand

Organizations are more than just a location for matching supply
and demand. According to the organizational perspective, organizations play an active role in constructingsupply and demand because
organizations mediate both individual and structural attributes.
84. See Granovetter, supra note 79, at 14; Baron & Bielby, supra note 11, at 740.
85. Baron & Bielby, supra note 11, at 741.
86. Baron, supra note 11, at 61.
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Organizations impinge on [individual employment] outcomes in

two important ways. First, the division of labor among jobs and
organizations generates a distribution of opportunities and rewards

that often antedates, both logically and temporally, the hiring of
people to fill those jobs. Second, organizational procedures for

matching workers to jobs affect the distribution of rewards and
opportunities within and across firms. .... 7

For instance, individuals' "choices" of employment may depend
significantly on the organizational opportunities that are available to
them. 8 Many women in the Marine Corps 9 and other traditionally
male jobs such as construction and mechanics9 report that they
initially were attracted to their jobs because the employing organizations made active efforts to recruit them, not because they had been
seeking non-traditional work.9"
Alternatively, organizations may define jobs in such a way as to
discourage women or minority applicants. Although Title VII
prohibits explicit gender- and race-based employment criteria, 9
courts have been reluctant to recognize the role of employers in
constructing their applicant flow. 3 As a result, organizations may

87. Id. at 38.
88. SeeKANTER, supranote 10, at 15 (calling attention to domination of large organizations
over economic and political life in United States and abroad); Jacobs, supra note 52, at 160
(demonstrating long-term trends in occupational segregation by sex in farm and non-farm
employment); Schultz, supra note 9, at 1815-39 (downplaying role of women's preferences in
accounting for occupational sex segregation). See generally CYNTHIA COCKBURN, MACHINERY OF
DOMINANCE: WOMEN, MEN AND TECHNICAL KNOw-How (1985) (examining the accommodation
of sexual division of labor in technology-based employment).
89. See generally CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN AND MEN
IN NON-TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS (1989) (discussing gender stratification in U.S. Marine
Corps).
90. See generally MOLLY MARTIN, HARD HATrED WOMEN (1988) (presenting narratives of
women's experiences in skilled trades); JEAN RErrH SCHROEDEL, ALONE IN A CROWD: WOMEN
IN THE TRADES TELL THEIR STORIES (1985) (providing anecdotal accounts of women's
experiences in traditionally male jobs); MARY LINDENSTEIN WALSHOK, BLUE-COLLAR WOMEN:
PIONEERS ON THE MALE FRONTIER (1981) (examining women's motivations to undertake
nontraditional work, their experiences in such employment, and impact of their taking
nontraditional jobs on their other, more traditional roles).
91. As one former secretary explains, "I didn't start thinking about non-traditional work
But as soon as the possibility was
until I heard the carpenters were looking for women ....
mentioned, my imagination went with it." SCHROEDEL, supra note 90, at 35. A woman who
became a sailor said, "[I]t wasn't until I moved to Seattle when I was surrounded by
organizations and groups that seemed encouraging of this---just seeing flyers about workshops
on women in non-traditional trades, having Mechanica available where you could learn the
details about steps in joining a union. That's when it became a real possibility." Id. at 77.
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (defining unlawful employment practices).
93. SeeSchultz, supranote 9, at 1769-99. In a landmark sex discrimination suit against Sears
Roebuck, the court found that Sears screened applicants for its high-paying commission sales
positions by asking questions such as, "Have you ever done any hunting?", "Have you ever served
in the military?", and "Do you swear often?" See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp.
1264, 1300-04 (N.D. IIl. 1986) (holding that Sears did not engage in nationwide pattern of
discrimination by gender in its hiring, promotion, or payment practices), aff'ad 839 F.2d 302 (7th
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play a significant role in constructing their "external" labor supply
through advertising, recruitment, and screening practices, as well as
through the maintenance and perpetuation of identifiable organizational cultures.94
Organizations also may play a significant role in constructing their
internal labor supply through formal mechanisms such as job
classification and the organization of internal mobility ladders, as well
as through informal mechanisms such as "tracking."95 Numerous
studies have demonstrated that the availability of internal mobility
ladders affects employees' aspirations for advancement and thus their
performance on the job. People in jobs with little opportunity for
advancement tend to adapt to their situation by lowering their
aspirations, focusing their attention on non-work activities, and
expressing little interest in promotion. 6 People in jobs with greater
advancement opportunities tend to raise their aspirations and to
commit themselves both to their work and to their own advance97

ment.

Even when internal mobility is available uniformly, as in most
professional organizations, organizational leaders may "track"
individual employees, informally grooming them for success (or

Cir. 1988). Items sold on commission included automotive supplies, appliances, and tools, but
notjewelry, cosmetics, or apparel. See id. at 1289, 1306-07. Nevertheless, the court accepted as
a defense Sears' argument that women were "not interested" in applying for commission sales
positions. See id. at 1352-53.
94. See Schultz, supra note 9, at 1815-16 (emphasizing role of structural incentives and social
relations in shaping women's aspirations within work organizations).
95. See KANTER, supranote 10, at 133-34 (addressing mobility and tracking).
96. Kanter's research on secretaries suggests that rather than focusing on salary or personal
recognition for their achievements, the women in these low mobility jobs tended to focus on
symbolic rewards such as flattery and access to inside information. See id. at 87; see also ELY
CHINOY, AuTOMOBILE WORKERS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 86, 110-22 (1955) (suggesting that
value placed by automobile workers on employment success is not as important as overall
satisfaction with lifestyle away from job); Robert Dubin, Industrial Workers' Worlds: A Study of the
"CentralLife Interests" of Industrial Workers, 3 SOC. PROBS. 131, 134-40 (1956) (arguing that
industrial workers attach themselves to work and workplaces but do not value or invest in social
experience of work); Robert H. Guest, Work Careers and Aspirationsof Automobile Workers, 19 AM.
Soc. REv. 155, 157-58 (1954) (providing evidence that automobile workers do not expect
opportunities for increase in economic or social status with present employer even though they
have hope for change in job control or nature of employment).
97. A woman in Kanter's study who had been a secretary for 20 years suddenly was
upgraded from assistant manager to manager. See KANwER, supra note 10, at 135. The woman
told Kanter that before her promotion, she never had wanted to be anything but a secretary and
that she was, in fact, reluctant to take the newjob. See id. Once she was promoted, however,
"her aspirations soared." Id. "'Now I'm ambitious, probably overly so. I will probably work
twenty more years, and I expect to move up at least six grade levels, maybe to vice-president.
Isn't that something... ?'" Id. See generallyJerry A. Jacobs, The Sex Typing of Aspirations and
Occupations: Instability Duringthe Careersof Young Women, 68 SOC. Sc. Q. 122 (1987) (explaining
extent to which socialization affects women's career aspirations); Schultz, supra note 9, at 182732.
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failure) by controlling their access to choice work assignments,
personal mentoring, and extra-curricular social interaction." To the
extent that employees internalize employers' informal expectations,
such expectations may prove self-fulfilling:
Those people set on high mobility tracks tend to develop attitudes
and values that impel them further along the track: work commitment, high aspirations, and upward orientations. Those set on low
mobility tracks tend to become indifferent, to give up, and thus to
"prove" that their initial placement was correct.'
Organizations also may play a significant role in constructing the
labor market and other demand-side influences. For instance, recent
studies of wage determination indicate that organizations play a
critical role in determining "market" rates for traditionally female
jobs." ° In their study of the Washington State pay system, Bridges
and Nelson find that although market forces influence wage rates,
market forces are "heavily mediated" by organizational factors such as
custom, political expediency, and the power balance among internal
They argue that "much of the
organizational constituencies."0
gender inequality in the system is... the direct product of organizational decision-making,""0 2 and conclude that "[t]he definition of
'market rates' is itself an organizational process ....
[T]he market
is to some extent socially constructed by the employing organization
"103

Baron and Newman reach a similar conclusion in their study of the
They analyze the effects of
California State civil service system."
organization and job characteristics on prescribed pay rates for
positions held disproportionately by women and nonwhites. They
find that the propensity toward the "devaluation" of such jobs varies
significantly across different organizational settings, depending on
factors such as the age of the job, the number of job-holders, the
objectivity of performance criteria, and the availability of union
representation. 5 Like Bridges and Nelson, Baron and Newman
conclude that organizations play a significant role in constructing
"market" demands:

98. See KANTER, supra note 10, at 133-34 (describing "fast track" and incentives produced
by such opportunity).
99. i&at 158.
100. See Baron & Newman, For What It's Worth, supra note 12, at 172-73; Bridges & Nelson,
supra note 16, at 653-54.
101. See Bridges & Nelson, supranote 16, at 654.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 647.
104. See Baron & Newman, For What It's Worth, supra note 12, at 172-73.
105. See id. at 172.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSnIY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:669

[T]he, ..distinction between market and political determinants of
How positions and their
wage rates may . ..be specious . ...
relevant markets are defined is often greatly influenced by organizational politics and social custom.... [T]he organizational context
of wage determination is critical .... "

"Structuralist" critics traditionally have advocated legal intervention
as the cure for market defects. The initial structuralist research
agenda was tied closely to legal debates about the need for (and

10 7
efficacy of) equal employment and comparable worth legislation;

and structuralist theory continues to animate doctrinal debates within

Title VII scholarship."' 8 However, recent studies of legal compliance
suggest thatjust as organizations mediate the impact of market forces,
organizations also mediate the impact of law, particularly
antidiscrimination law, where enforcement is weak and compliance
standards are ambiguous."° °

Furthermore, in her nationwide study of 346 organizations,
Edelman finds that organizations vary considerably in their responsive-

ness to federal antidiscrimination law with organizational characteristics such as size, visibility, and proximity to the public sector affecting

both the type and rate of organizational response. 0 Furthermore,
Edelman argues, organizational responses to law affect broader legal
and societal definitions of what constitutes "compliance."
Laws that regulate the employment relationship set forth broad and
ambiguous principles that give organizations wide latitude to
construct the meaning of compliance. Such laws set in motion a
process of definition during which organizations test and collectively construct the forms and boundaries of compliance ....

106. Id.at 173.
107. See, e.g., KANTER, supra note 10, at 265-87; Belier, supra note 75, at 171; England &
Dunn, supra note 45, at 243-45; Eberts & Stone, supra note 75, at 504.
108. See Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and CulturalDominationTheories Meet Title VII: Some
Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370, 2402 (1994) (exploring legal discourse on
theories of workplace inequality since passage of Title VII and implications for 1990s); Schultz,
supra note 9, at 1749 (discussing theories of "choice" and "coercion" as sources for workplace
segregation by sex in context of Title VII cases).
109. See Edelman, Symbolic Structures,supranote 13, at 1532; see alsoLauren B. Edelman et al.,
InternalDispute Resolution: The Transformationof Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 L.& Soc"' REv.
497, 511-13 (1992) (describing how employees' use of internal grievance procedures alters
interpretation and impact of EEO law); Lauren B. Edelman et al., LegalAmbiguity and thePolitics
of Compliance: Affirmative Action Offlcers'Dilemma, 13 LAW & POL'Y 73,74-79 (1991) (arguing that
employers significantly affect scope of EEO regulation through definition of internal EEO
positions and selection of key internal regulatory personnel).
110. See Edelman, Symbolic Structures,supra note 13, at 1554-69. Edelman's study was based
on a national, stratified probability sample of organizations, which included private firms,
colleges and universities, and government agencies. See id.at 1569.
111. Id at 1532.
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3.

Variations in organizationalinequality
By emphasizing the role of organizations as agents of stratification,
the organizational perspective calls attention to the dynamics of
stratification as an interactive process. Organizations not only filter
environmental demands and mediate their impact; organizations also
act back on their environments, altering environmental (or "market")
demands. Organizations act back on their environments when they
foster or retard individual advancement, when they reify or challenge
traditional pay scales, and when they endorse or resist structural
change.
Thus, although the organizational perspective does not deny the
importance of external (supply-side or demand-side) constraints, it
emphasizes the importance of variations within those constraints. The
organizational perspective suggests that even within the same labor
market, organizations may vary considerably in their levels of gender
and race inequality. These organizational variations matter because
organizational policies and practices help construct the labor market-for individual workers and for other organizations.
E. An "Organizational"Model of Law Firm Integration
The organizational perspective is particularly appropriate for
studying the process of gender and race integration within elite law
firms. First, private law firms are a key arena for "matching" new
lawyers to jobs and-perhaps more importantly-to opportunities for
further training. Many law students work in large firms during the
summer and immediately after graduation simply for the training such
firms can provide. 2 This initial "match-the way new lawyers
perform, and the way they are typed by the firms that employ
them-may have significant long-term consequences for lawyers'
1 13

careers.

Second, the evaluation of lawyers' work is relatively subjective.
Lawyers' work tends to be non-routine even within the same area of
practice, and different kinds of cases require different kinds of work
products. Thus, there rarely is an objective basis for comparing the

112. See Dana Coleman, Finally! JobsforLaw Grads, N.J. LAw., Aug. 19, 1996, at 1 (reporting
that 56% of 1995 law graduates took jobs in private law firms); Michael Gebhardt, Doing the OC
Dance;THE REcoRDER, Oct. 20, 1995, at I (reporting that many law students takejobs with large
firms for training, for debt-relief, and because they do not know what else to do).
113. See Ralph L. Blankenship, Organizational Careers: An Interactionist Perspective in
COLLEAGuES IN ORGANmZATION: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIoNAL WoRK 206-22
(Ralph L.Blankenship ed., 1977) (emphasizing effect of firstjob on "career").
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quality of different lawyers' work. Furthermore, lawyers in elite firms
typically work in teams, 114 which complicates the assessment of
individual contributions:
Ultimately, the assessment of A's [an associate lawyer] output comes
down to a subjective evaluation of performance by those charged
with observing him. Because of the inherent subjectivity of the
assessment, A cannot verify it. He cannot, for instance, look up his
performance and say, "Hey, you miscalculated my contribution."
In addition, neither P [the supervising partner] nor A can easily
separate one individual's contribution to the production of legal
services from that of other participants. 5
As a result, law firm entry and promotion standards also are subjective. In describing what it takes to make partner in his firm, one
partner reports:
I'm trying to figure out what it is ....

There is some quality, some

je ne sais quoi quality, that is very vital. Because here's a person that
otherwise you're willing to have around at a relatively high title for
the rest of your life, and there is something,just something missing.
It's not diligence. It's not ability. It's not, certainly, many, many
things, because you've screened them, you've screened them ....
(WMP1)

The subjectivity of the evaluation process leaves law firms significant
room to "construct" their own labor supply at both the associate and
partnership levels. For instance, law firms construct their associate
supply simply by choosing the law schools from which they recruit and
choosing the lawyers who conduct on-campus interviews: "[Law firms]
have a perception of what the top 20 law schools are, and that may
differ from firm to firm, but they don't worry about where those law
schools are, they recruit at all of them ...

."

(WMP2)

[O] ne thing that. . . not a lot of people know is that a lot of firms
...

have at least one school where some of their partners went, and

they wouldn't ordinarily recruit there if that hadn't been the case.
But it is; they go there a lot. For [my firm] it's [x], which isn't
normally a school that would be hit up a lot by a firm like [my
firm]. (WMA1)
Law firms also may shape their associate supply through the identification and perpetuation of distinctive firm cultures that are known to

114.
115.

See Galanter & Palay, supranote 22, at 748.
ldMat 776-77.
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students6 and other firms, and that typically are a source of firm
11
pride.
Law firms also construct their own partner supply, most importantly
through the allocation of work and training opportunities among
associates. For instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that associates
with distinctive incoming credentials get better initial work assignments and more attention from firm leaders than other associates:
Credentials tend to impress people at law firms... and [they] may
affect the kind of work you are given. I think I was able to work
with certain people and indeed to do corporate work rather than
being assigned to the litigation
department ...
11 7

in part because I

had very good credentials.
In some cases, partners may track individual associates whom they
regard as particularly promising, giving them special assignments and
nurturing their progress:
[T]he firms almost from the beginning, I think, have different
notions about the lawyers that are coming in. And if anything, a
kind of implicit secret tracking system in which some young lawyers
very soon, if not the day after they arrive or the day before they
arrive, are identified as superstars and get special assignments and
are sought after by all the partners who have a chance to compete
for them. I do this. I have a very sexy practice. I dangle it before
the people who seem to me the best in the associate pool ....
I
train the hell out of them because that's part of the bargain ....
The larger number are not going to have that happen ... and
they're going to do a lot more routine work ....
(WMP3)

Associates with less distinctive incoming credentials, on the other
hand, tend to get less specialized attention and may suffer disproportionate criticism by their evaluators.
If you come from a lesser school it is harder to prove yourself and
you have to go against the expectation that you won't be as good.
So if you do a brilliant piece of work, people are inclined to see the
flaws more quickly and people are inclined not to give you a second

116. SeeJames Agger, 1996: A MovingExperiene, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 23, 1996,
at 1 (discussing cultural barriers to mergers between law firms); Nancy E. Lasater, The Fine Art
of Finding a Firm, THE CoNN. L. TiB., May 6, 1996, at 29 (emphasizing the importance of
considering firm culture as part of lawyer's job search);Joel A. Rose, How a Firm's CulturePlays

a Part in Succes N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1, 1996, at 5 (explaining the importance of addressing firm
culture as part of long-term financial planning); What s So SpecialAboutD.C. Firms, LEGAL TIMES,

May 8, 1995, at S38 (describing allure of Washington, D.C., firms for young lawyers); see also
William G. Ouchi &Alan L.Wilkins, OrganizationalCulture 11 ANN. REv. SoC. 457,461-62 (1985)
(tracing evolution of study and analysis of organizational culture).
117. Harvard graduate, quoted in David Weitz, Career Paths of Harvard Alumni: A Case Study
on Corporate Law Practice 44 (1984) (unpublished paper, on file with The American University
Law Raiew).
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chance if you make a mistake. Whereas if you go to a school like
Harvard ... it's a little bit of an inside track."'

Differential access to work and training eventually produces real
differences in ability-differences that matter when it comes time for
promotion. In Ezold v. Wolf, Block,"' for example, Ezold was turned
down for partnership at Wolf, Block, in part because she lacked
experience handling "complex cases. "120 Ezold had complained
about her work assignments-specifically, the lack of complex
cases-on several occasions throughout her years with the firm, but
due to her average incoming credentials and, Ezold argued, her sex,
her opportunities for training were systematically limited."' Ezold
sued under Title VII and won in district court,'2 2 but the Third
Circuit reversed, holding that the firm was not accountable for the
deficiencies in Ezold's training:
Title VII requires employers to avoid certain prohibited types of
invidious discrimination, including sex discrimination. It does not

require employers to treat all employees fairly, closely monitor their
3

2
progress and insure them every opportunity for advancement.

Finally, as Ezold suggests, law firm employment decisions are
subject to very little legal regulation under Title VII.'2 ' As recently
as 1980, a court held that law firm partnership decisions were
not covered under Title VII.'
Although this decision was later

118.

Another Harvard graduate, quoted in Weitz, supranote 117, at 45; seeRANDALL COLLINS,

THE CREDENTIAL SocIETY: AN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION 147-59

(1979) (outlining development of legal profession and its institutions).
119. 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992)
120. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d
Cir. 1992).
121. See id. at 1176-78. Ezold was told when she was hired that she would have trouble
succeeding at Wolf, Block because she was a woman, because she had attended Villanova (a nonelite law school), and because she had not served on law review. See id. at 1177.
122. See id. at 1192.
123. Ezod, 983 F.2d at 542.
124. SeeJeffery D. Horst, The Application of Title VII to Law Firm PartnershipDecisions: Women
Strugge toJoin the Club, 44 OHIO ST. LJ. 841, 875-80 (1983) (criticizing courts' tolerance for the
use of subjective employment criteria by professional employers generally and within law firms
in particular) ;Jane Howard-Martin, A CriticalAnalysisofJudicial OpinionsinProfessionalEmployment
DiscriminationCases, 26 HoW. LJ. 723, 723 (1983) (criticizing weakness of Title VII regulation
in the professional employment context); Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking
Glass: Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 HouS. L. REv. 1517,
1520 (1995) (describing the failure of Title VII to promote integration in upper-leveljobs). See
generally Bartholet, supranote 7 (comparing regulation of upper- and lower-leveljubs under Title
VII).
125. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1303 (1980) (holding
that law partnerships are not protected by Title VII because professional partnerships do not
constitute "employment relationship" under meaning of statute), rev'd, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). "In
a very real sense a professional partnership is like a marriage. It is, in fact, nothing less than a
'business marriage,' for better or worse . ...
To use Title VII to coerce a mismatched or
unwanted partnership too closely resembles a statute for the enforcement of shotgun weddings."
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reversed, 2 ' courts remain reluctant to second-guess professional
employers absent blatant evidence of discrimination. 2 7
Thus, to the extent that "organizational" conditions matter in
accounting for patterns of occupational segregation and integration,
they should matter in elite law firms particularly. Relative to other
private employers, elite law firms exert significant control over their
own labor supplies and over the standards by which labor is evaluated. 2 Furthermore, changes in the market for legal services have
produced changes in the organization of work within firms, and thus
significant variation among firms in the conditions for individual
advancement. Thus, to the extent that organizational conditions
affect gender and race integration, we should be able to see it in elite
law firms during this period of reorganization and change.
I.

EMPIICAL CONTEXT

Part II establishes the empirical context for my research: How
much do elite law firms vary in the gender and race composition of
lawyers? To what extent can variations in the level of law firm
integration be explained by variations in the external labor supply, or
by other labor market determinants (such as geographic location,

starting salary, and growth rate)?
A.

The Gender and Race Composition of the Sample Firms
The lawyers who work in elite law firms historically have been white
Protestant men who graduated from prestigious law schools such as

Id at 1305.
126. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984).
127. See Ezokd 983 F.2d at 527; see alsoJay P. Krupin, Operatinga Law Firm by the Book; Attorneys
Often Fail to Realize That Labor Law Applies to Their Firms LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at S38
("While law firms in the United States have begun to view themselves from a business
perspective, few seem to realize that, as businesses, they are subject to the web of regulations
affecting employers generally. Because of the professional atmosphere in which firms exist, legal
requirements for employment-related decision-making are seldom taken into account.").
128. See Bartholet, supra note 7, at 947 (criticizing courts' deference to professional
employers); see a/soAndrew Abbott, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVIsION OF
EXPERT LABOR 134-42 (1988) (discussing sources of professional power); EUOT FR1EDSON,
PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY ON THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 200-05
(1986) (discussing professionals' control over product and personnel standards).
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As recently as 1970, women and
Harvard, Columbia, and Yale."
excluded.'completely
almost
were
people of color
Since 1970, the gender and race composition of elite law firms has
changed considerably at the associate level. By 1980, 23.2% of the
associates in the sample were women; by 1990, 36.2% of associates
were women (see Table la).31 Although the level of racial diversity
is much lower, it too has increased. By 1980, 3.6% of associates in the
sample were minorities; by 1990, 6.5% of associates were minorities
(see Table la).3 2
At the partnership level, elite law firms still are predominantly male
(89.7%)
and almost exclusively white. Of 6509 partners in 1990, 5841
33
were male, and 6382 (98.0%) were white (see Table lb).
At both the associate and the partnership levels, however, there are
significant variations among firms. In 1990, the percentage of female
associates per firm ranged from 18% to 56% (see table 2a). The
percentage of black associates ranged from 0% to 7%; the percentage
of Hispanic associates ranged from 0% to 12%; and the percentage
of Asian American associates ranged from 0% to 13%. The same
year, the percentage of female partners per firm ranged from 3% to
28%; the percentage of black partners ranged from 0% to 6%; and
the percentage of Asian American partners ranged from 0% to 8%.

129. In 1962, more than 70% of the lawyers in New York's leading law firms had graduated
from Harvard, Yale, or Columbia law schools; 30% were listed in the Social Register. See ERWIN
SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL MAN? 39 (1969). Heinz &
Laumann report similar patterns in Chicago. See JOHN P. HEINz & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN,

CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCrURE OF THE BAR 182 (1982).
130. See ABEL, supra note 21, at 99, 105 (citing near absence of women and minority
associates in elite law firms until early 1970s); CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN INLAW 22 (1981)
(stating that pressure from black organizations and women's groups, as well as government
regulation, opened law firm structure and increased opportunities during late 1960s and early
1970s).
131. The representation of women among the associates in the sample appears to be
somewhat higher than in large law firms generally. The National Law Journalreports that in
1981, 23.9% of associates in the nation's largest 151 law firms were women (compared to 25.9%
within the sample). SeeJensen, supranote 1, at 28. In 1989, 33% of associates in the largest 251
firms were women (compared to 36.3% in the sample). See id.
132. Minority representation among associates also appears to be somewhat higher in the
sample firms than in the nation's largest 251 law firms. The NationalLaw Journalfound that in
1989 appoximately 3% of associates were people of color, compared to 5.7% in the sample. See
id.
133. The representation of women and people of color among the partners in the sample
tracks their representation in large law firms generally. In 1989, the percentage of female
partners in the sample was 9.9% (compared to 9.2% in the largest 251 firms); the percentage
of black partners was 0.7% (compared to 0.9% in the largest 251 firms); the percentage of
Hispanic partners was 0.4% (compared to 0.5% in the largest 251 firms); and the percentage
of Asian American partners was 0.5% in both the sample and in the largest 251 firms. See id.
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Table 1: The Gender and Race Composition of the Sample:
Changes Over Time (1980-1990)
Table la: Associate Composition

Year

# Assoc.

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

4849
5910
6673
7980
8536
8859
9027
9980
10853
11594
11457

# Female (%)

# Black (%)

1125
1530
1918
2370
2686
2919
3014
3489
3908
4209
4143

100
125
151
193
215
222
221
228
255
271
295

(23.2)
(25.9)
(28.7)
(29.7)
(31.5)
(32.9)
(33.4)
(35.0)
(36.0)
(36.3)
(36.2)

(2.1)
(2.1)
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
(2.5)
(2.4)
(2.3)
(2.3)
(2.3)
(2.61

# Hispanic (%)
31
39
56
67
82
90
107
95
137
160
153

(0.6)
(0.7)
(0.8)
(0.8)
(1.0)
(1.0)
(1.2)
(1.0)
(1.3)
(1.4)
(1.3)-

# Asian
American (%)
44
69
88
107
134
138
170
191
231
249
295

(0.9)
(1.2)
(1.3)
(1.3)
(1.6)
(1.6)
(1.9)
(1.9)
(2.1)
(2.1)
(2.6)

Table lb: Partner Composition
Year

# Assoc.

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

3225
3885
4189
5015
5413
5645
5661
6092
6422
6656
6509

# Female (%)
84
115
161
219
278
356
393
485
586
661
668

(2.6)
(3.0)
(3.8)
(4.4)
(5.1)
(6.3)
(6.9)
(8.0)
(9.1)
(9.9)
(10.3)

# Black (%)
12
17
20
32
40
43
38
42
48
49
54

(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.5)
(0.6)
(0.7)
(0.8)
(0.7)
(0.7)
(0.7)
(0.7)
(0.8)

# Hispanic (%)
6
8
12
19
17
19
19
24
29
27
32

(0.2)
(0.2)
(0.3)
(0.4)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.4)
(0.5)
(0.4)
(0.5)

# Asian
American (%)
4
3
5
7
18
22
20
26
26
33
41

(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.3)
(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.5)
(0.6)
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Furthermore, variation among the sample firms tends to increase
over time, especially at the partnership level. At the associate level,
the standard deviation from the mean increases over time in the case
of Hispanics and Asian Americans, but was relatively stable for women
and blacks (see Table 2a). At the partnership level, however, the
standard deviation from the mean increases for all groups except
Hispanics (see Table 2b).
Table 2: The Gender and Race Composition of the Sample:
Variations Among Firms
Table 2a: Associate Composition
Proportion Female

Proportion Black

Year

(n)

Mean

(SD)

Min

Max

Mean

(SD)

Min

Max

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

(73)
(80)
(80)
(91)
(96)
(96)
(91)
(94)
(95)
(91)
(82)

.239
.260
.285
.292
.313
.330
.342
.361
.372
.378
.386

(.079)
(.074)
(.066)
(.085)
(.078)
(.068)
(.067)
(.070)
(.079)
(.081)
(.074)

.12
.06
.10
.00
.04
.17
.15
.20
.13
.10
.18

.46
.44
.45
.48
.48
.50
.51
.58
.55
.55
.56

.018
.019
.020
.023
.026
.025
.029
.025
.024
.025
.028

(.017)
(.017)
(.016)
(.021)
(.022)
(.022)
(.025)
(.023)
(.022)
(.017)
(.017)

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

.07
.06
.05
.09
.10
.11
.14
.12
.10
.10
.07

.326

(.087)

.11

.50

.024

(.020)

.00

.09

Mean

1980-1990

Proportion Hispanic

Proportion Asian American

Year

(n)

Mean

(SD)

Min Max

(SD)

Min

Max

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

(73)
(80)
(80)
(91)
(96)
(96)
(91)
(94)
(95)
(91)
(82)

.007
.007
.009
.009
.011
.011
.013
.009
.014
.016
.017

(.012)
(.011)
(.012)
(.012)
(.014)
(.017)
(.018)
(.012)
(.015)
(.020)
(.021)

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

.05
.04
.05
.05
.08
.10
.09
.05
.06
.11
.12

.009
.012
.013
.013
.016
.015
.019
.019
.021
.020
.025

(.015)
(.017)
(.017)
(.018)
(.023)
(.023)
(.027)
(.023)
(.022)
(.020)
(.025)

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

.09
.08
.07
.08
.12
.17
.13
.12
.10
.10
.13

.011

(.016)

.00

.07

.017

(.022)

.00

.11

1980-1990
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Table 2: The Gender and Race Composition of the Sample:
Variations Among Firms
Table 2b: Partner Composition
Proportion Black

Proportion Female

Min Max

Year

Mean

(SD)

Min

Max

Mean

(SD)

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

.026
.030
.038
.043

(.023)
(.026)
(.030)
(.034)

.00
.00
.00
.00

.09
.10
.14
.16

.051

(.038)

.00

.21

.003
.004
.004
.006
.006

(.009)
(.010)
(.010)
(.011)
(.011)

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

.03
.06
.06
.05
.05

.062
.070
.078
.089
.100
.109

(.041)
(.043)
(.042)
(.044)
(.048)
(.046)

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.03

.22
.22
.19
.20
.23
.28

.007

(.011)

.00

.06

.006
.006
.007
.007
.009

(.010)
(.009)
(.012)
(.011)
(.012)

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

.04
.03
.06
.05
.06

1980-1990

.064

(.047)

.00

.18

.006

(.011)

.00

.05

(SD)

Min

Max

Proportion Asian Ameilcan

Proportion Hispanic
Year

Mean

(SD)

Min

Max

Mean

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

.003
.003
.004
.004
.004
.004
.004
.005
.006
.005
.006

(.013)
(.011)
(.012)
(.013)
(.012)
(.011)
(.012)
(.013)
(.013)
(.013)
(.012)

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00.00
.00
.00

.09
.08
.08
.07
.07
.07
.08
.07
.07
.07
.06

.001
.001
.001
.002
.003
.004
.004
.005
.005
.006
.008

(.006)
(.005)
(.006)
(.006)
(.014)
(.014)
(.013)
(.012)
(.011)
(.013)
(.013)

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

.03
.03
.03
.03
.12
.10
.08
.07
.05
.07
.08

1980-1990

.004

(.012)

.00

.07

.004

(.011)

.00

.06

B.

Sources of Change over Time

Changes in the composition of the sample over time reflect changes
in the composition of the legal profession generally. Since about
1970, women and people of color have been entering law school at
an increasing rate, and they make up a growing proportion of elite
law school graduates. These changes have had a significant effect on
the elite firm labor supply.

T
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Changes in national law school enrollment

Table 3 reports law school enrollment figures for American Bar
Association approved law schools. The most remarkable change over
the past twenty years has been the growing number of women
The percentage of women law students
entering law school.
increased from 8.7% in 1970 to 42.5% in 1990 (see Table 3). And
while overall law school enrollment increased approximately 60%
between 1970 and 1990, the enrollment of women increased more
than 700 percent-from 6682 in 1970 to 54,097 in 1990. Thus, the
increase in the number of women enrolled (47,415) accounts for
more than 95% of the total increase in law school enrollment
(49,243).
Table 3: National Law School Enrollment (1970-1990)*
Year

Total

# Female

70-71
71-72
72-73
73-74
74-75
75-76
76-77
77-78
78-79
79-80
80-81
81-82
82-83
83-84
84-85
85-86
86-87
87-88
88-89
89-90
90-91

78,018
91,225
98,042
101,675
105,708
111,047
112,401
113,080
116,150
117,297
119,501
120,879
121,791
121,201
119,847
118,700
117,813
117,997
120,694
124,471
127,261

6682
8567
11878
16303
21283
26020
29343
31650
35775
37534
40834
43245
45539
46361
46897
47486
47920
48920
50932
53113
54097

(%) # Black (%) # Hispanic (%)
8.7)
9.4)
(12.1)
(16.0)
(20.1)
(23.4)
(26.1)
(28.0)
(30.8)
(32.0)
(34.2)
(35.8)
(37.4)
(38.2)
(39.1)
(40.0)
(40.7)
(41.5)
(42.2)
(42.7)
(42.5)

5304
5350
5257
5506
5789
5852
5967
5955
6051
5894
6028
6321
6791
7432

2531
2788
2817
3013
3188
3406
3496
3507

3679
3865
4074
4342
4726
5038

# Asian
American

(1.2)
(1.2)
(1.3)
(1.4)
(1.4)
(1.6)
(1.6)

(1.7)
(1.8)

(1.9)
(2.2)
(2.6)
(2.9)
(3.4)

* These figures represent total J.D. enrollment in American Bar Association approved law
schools (excluding enrollment in Puerto Rican law schools). See AMERIcAN BAR ASS'N, A
REVEw oF LEGAL EDUCATON rN Ta UNrT= STATES, 65 (1990). Data for minority enrollment
are not available before 1977.
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Law students also have become more racially diverse. Between 1980
and 1990, the percentage of black law students rose from 4.6% to
5.8%; the percentage of Hispanic law students rose from 2.5% to
3.9%; and the percentage of Asian American law students increased
from 1.4% to 3.4% (see Table 3). In fact, during the period for
which data are available, the number of Asian American law students
has increased more than any other group relative to their initial
representation.
The number of Asian American law students
increased 212% between 1977 and 1990, compared to a 71% increase
in the number of women students, a 40% increase in the number of
black students, and a 99% increase in the number of Hispanic
students during the same period.
2.

Changes in the composition of elite school graduates

Women and people of color also make up an increasing proportion
of the graduates of elite law schools.Y Table 4 reports the number
of J.D. degrees awarded per year by thirteen elite law schools-the
"feeder" schools for the firms in the sample. 3 ' Comparing the
percentage of women enrolled nationally (from Table 3) with the
percentage of women graduating from elite law schools (from Table
4), these figures show that elite law schools graduate roughly the same
percentage of women as are enrolled in law schools nationally-about
42% in 1990.136

134. Previous studies have reported that women are less likely than men to attend elite law
schools, see EPSTEIN, supra note 130, at 35, and that minority law students are less likely to
graduate from law school than whites, see NELSON, supranote 23, at 133. See ABEL, supranote
21, at 103 (stating that nine out of ten white law students remain enrolled by third year, but only
seven or eight minority students out of ten are enrolled by third year). The data presented here
suggest that these patterns may be changing, however. See Table 4.
135.

SeeAMEICAN BAR ASS'N, A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 10, 12,

14, 19, 28, 31, 39, 50, 59 (1990). The data cover the following 13 schools: Berkeley, Chicago,
Columbia, Georgetown, Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, NYU, Pennsylvania, Stanford, UCLA,
Virginia, and Yale. I selected these schools based on information provided by the sample firms
about where they recruit and about the educational backgrounds of firm members. The list may
not be completely accurate in that some "feeder" schools doubtless are omitted, and others may
have been named as status-symbols by firms that do not draw heavily upon their graduates.
However, I could have made essentially the same list on the basis of lawyers' common knowledge
regarding law schools' reputations and elite firm recruitment practices. See HEINZ & LAUMANN,
supra note 129, at 15-16 (stating that various ratings for law school groupings have yielded
consistent and similar results); see also BARRON'S GUIDE TO LAW SCHOOLS (1994). Although
Barron's does not rate law schools as "elite," students entering the schools I am calling "elite"
have some of the highest LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs.
136. The correlation between the percentage of law students who are women and the
percentage of elite school graduates who are women is .95.
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Table 4: Elite Law School Graduation Rates (1980-1990)
Year

#J.D.s
Awarded

# Female

(%)

# Minority

(%)

3757
3777
3999
3680
3748
3827
3428
3905
3929
3901
3927

1199
1312
1328
1373
1386
1455
1361
1582
1567
1585
1653

(31.9)
(34.7)
(33.2)
(37.3)
(37.0)
(38.0)
(39.7)
(40.5)
(39.9)
(40.6)
(42.1)

472
578
483
561
583
572
556
625
600
718
739

(12.6)
(15.3)
(12.1)
(15.2)
(15.6)
(14.9)
(16.2)
(16.0)
(15.3)
(18.4)
(18.8)

1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91

Table 5: Correlations Between the Composition of Associates in the
Sample (1980-1990) and the Composition of Law Students
Nationally (1980-1990)

Composition of
Associates in Sample
Proportion Female
Proportion Black

Proportion
Female

Composition of Law Students
Proportion
Proportion
Proportion
Black
Hispanic
Asian American

.9982***
(11)
.6400**
(11)

Proportion Hispanic

.9375***
(11)

Proportion Asian American

* p < .05

** p < .01

.9505"**
(11)
*** p < .001

(2-tailed)
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The percentage of elite school graduates who are minorities
appears to be somewhat higher than minority enrollment generally.
In 1990, 18.8% of the law degrees awarded by elite law schools were
awarded to minorities (see Table 4), yet minorities made up only
13.1% of law students nationally (5.8% black, 3.9% Hispanic, and
3.4% Asian American) (see Table 3)."7
3. Relationship to associate composition
These changes in law school enrollment and elite school graduation
rates directly affect the external labor supply for elite law firms. Table
5 reports the correlations between the gender and race composition
of the associates in the sample (from Table 1) and the gender and
race composition of law students enrolled nationally (from Table 3)
over the eleven-year time period (1980-90). These figures show that
changes in the composition of associates in the sample are significantly correlated with changes in the composition of the law student
population, with correlation coefficients exceeding .90 for all groups
except blacks. Changes in the composition of associates in the sample
also are significantly correlated with changes in the composition of
elite school graduates (see Table 6).
Among the four groups, correlations with the external labor supply
are strongest for women (see Table 5). Although female law
graduates traditionally have been less likely than men to enter private
practice and more likely to take public interest or government
jobs,"~ the career patterns of male and female lawyers have been
converging over time; 3 9 and within private practice, women are
more likely than men to practice in large firms."4 As a result, the
137. Part of the difference may reflect the fact that the enrollment figures reported in Table
3 are race-specific, whereas the elite school graduation data from Table 4 are aggregated by race.
The two sets of figures are not directly comparable because the category of "minority" in Table
4 includes Native Americans and Alaskan Natives, who are not represented in the national
enrollment data. Compare supraTable 3, ith supra Table 4. However, this explanation cannot
account for all of the disparity because the number of Native American and Alaskan Native law
students isextremely low (the total number enrolled in law school in 1990-91 was 554). A more
plausible explanation is that elite lawschools enroll and graduate more minority group members
than law schools generally, perhaps as a result of their superior resources, high visibility, and
increased external pressure for inclusion.
138. In 1970, approximately 60% of all female lawyers were in private practice, compared
to about 70% of male lawyers. See ABEL, supra note 21, at 95. The proportion of females
working in government was more than twice that of men (37% versus 18%). See id.
139. In 1983, the proportion of female law graduates entering private practice (56%)
approached that of men (58.5%), as did the proportion of women taking government or public
interest jobs (16.9% of female graduates, compared to 12.4% of male graduates). See id. at 96.
140. Among all lawyers in private practice in 1980, 12% of the female lawyers practiced in
firms with 50 lawyers or more, compared to 7% of male lawyers. See CuRRAN Er AL, supranote
26, at 40. This difference does not simply reflect the fact that female lawyers are younger on
average than male lawyers, as the disproportionate representation of female lawyers in large
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representation of women among the associates in the sample closely
tracks their representation among new lawyers generally.
Correlations between associate composition and the external labor
supply are weakest for blacks. The correlation between national
enrollment and associate representation is only .64 for blacks,
compared to .99 for women, .94 for Hispanics, and .95 for Asian
Americans (see Table 5). Correlations between associate composition
and elite school graduation rates reflect a similar pattern (see Table
6) 141

Part of the explanation for the relative underrepresentation of
black associates may be that black law graduates are less likely than
other law graduates to enter private practice14 ' and may be less
likely to pass state bar examinations."
However, part of the
difference probably'reflects the persistence of racial discrimination by
elite law firms."4
firms becomes even more pronounced within younger admission cohorts. For instance,
considering only those lawyers admitted to private practice between 1971 and 1979, 14.2% of
the female lawyers practiced in firms with 50 lawyers or more, compared to only 8.6% of the
male lawyers. See id. at 46.
141. This comparison must be interpreted with caution, however, because minority
graduation data are not broken down by race. See supra note 137 (noting that elite school
graduation data from Table 4 is aggregated by race).
142. Until 1970, most black lawyers were sole practitioners or worked for the government.
See ABEL, supra note 21, at 105. Although black-white career patterns are converging, black
lawyers still are more likely than whites to enter public interest and government work. See id.
In 1983, only 45.7% of minority lawyers entered private practice, compared to 58.9% of white
lawyers. See id. at 106.
143. Abel reports that in 1984,48.3% of whites passed the California Bar, compared to 30%
of Asians, 18.1% of Latinos, and 11.6% of blacks. SeeABEL, supra note 21, at 103-04. To the
extent that this pattern persists, it probably reflects the fact that some black law students enter
law school with educational disadvantages, reflected in lower LSAT scores and lower
undergraduate GPAs. Among the 1986 graduates of UCLA law school, for example, 83% of
students admitted entirely on the basis of LSATs and GPAs passed the California Bar exam,
compared to only 26.5% of those admitted through the "diversity" program. See id.
144. The legal profession has a long histbry of race discrimination, against blacks in
particular. See id at 99. Although black lawyers were admitted to practice during Reconstruction (to serve newly-freed slaves), the American Bar Association formally excluded blacks until
1943, and many law schools barred blacks until they were forced to admit them under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See id.at 103. Within firms, black lawyers report that they often are viewed
as "tokens" or "special admits" who have earned their credentials only as the result of affirmative
action in law schools. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 28-29 (stating that minority lawyers feel
stigmatized by assumptions that they are beneficiaries of affirmative action). Furthermore, some
elite law firms continue to discriminate blatantly. See id.In 1989, the nation's largest law firm,
Baker & McKenzie, was banned from interviewing at the University of Chicago, the University
of California at Berkeley, and Georgetown University after a recruiting partner made racially
disparaging remarks to a black law student. See Clare Ansberry & Alice Swasy, Minority Job
Appicants Say Slurs Often Surfae, WALL ST.J., Feb. 10, 1989, at BI; see also Lisa Green Markoff,
Dean Suspends Baker & Mckenzie from 1989-90 Campus Interviews, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 13, 1989, at 4
(citing University of Chicago's decision to bar Baker & Mckenzie from on-campus interviews
after comments by firm's partner). The partner asked a student how she would react to being
called a "black bitch" or a "nigger" by adversaries and colleagues. SeeAnsberry & Awasy, supra,
at BI. Learning that she played golf, he asked, "Why don't blacks have their own country
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Table 6: Correlations Between the Composition of Associates in the
Sample (1980-1990) and the Composition of Elite Law School
Graduates (1980-1990)
Composition of Elite School Graduates

Composition of
Associates in Sample

Proportion Female

Proportion Female

.9422***
(ll)

Proportion Black

.5560***
(11)

Proportion Hispanic

.7629***

(11)

Proportion Asian American
* p < .05

** p < .01

Proportion Minority

.8226***

(11)

*

p <.001

(2-tailed)

4. Relationship to partnercomposition
At the partnership level, the relevant labor supply is associates, not
law students or elite law school graduates. However, changes in
associate composition create changes in the composition of lawyers
who are eligible to become partners. As Table 7 indicates, associate
composition is highly correlated with partner composition for the
sample as a whole.
Again, the supply-side relationship is strongest for women: The
gender composition of associates in the sample is almost perfectly
correlated with the gender composition of partners, with a correlation
coefficient of .9509 (see Table 7). However, the correlation between
associate composition and partnership composition is strong for the
other three groups as well (see Table 7).
To a significant extent, therefore, changes in the composition of
the sample over time reflect changes in the composition of the
external labor supply. The gender and race composition of the
associates in the sample is significantly correlated with the gender and
race composition of law students nationally and with the gender and
race composition of elite school graduates. Furthermore, partner
composition is significantly correlated with associate composition.

clubs?" Id. Then, answering his own question, he said, "I guess there aren't too many golf
courses in the ghetto." Id. For an excellent analysis of the underrepresentation of blacks in
large law firms, see David B. Wilkins & G. Miu Gulati, Wy Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firns? An InstitutionalAnalysis, 84 CAL. L.REV. 493 (1996).
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Table 7: Correlations Between the Composition of Partners in the
Sample (1980-1990) and the Composition of Associates in the
Sample (1980-1990)
Composition of Associates in the Sample

Composition of
Partners in the Sample

Proportion
Female

Proportion
Black

Proportion
Hispanic

Proportion
Asian American

.9509***

Proportion Female

(11)
.8805***

Proportion Black

(11)

.8476***
(11)

Proportion Hispanic

.9339***

Proportion Asian American

*

p < .05

** p < .01

(11)

*** p < .001

(2-tailed)

C. Sources of VariationAmong Firms
Law student enrollment statistics are only a crude measure of elite
law firms' external labor supply. National enrollment statistics cannot
capture demographic differences between cities, for instance, and the
composition of associates in any given year does not reflect the
composition of lawyers who actually are eligible to become partners.
It takes seven or eight years to become a partner in an elite law
firm," and associate cohorts have become more integrated over
time. Thus, the percentage of female and minority associates within
a firm in any given year is higher than the percentage of female and
minority associates who actually are eligible for promotion that year.

145.

Table 8.

The mean for the sample firms was 7.21 years for the time period as a whole. See infra
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Furthermore, other labor market variables may affect a law firm's
labor supply. For example, even though starting salary was a sample
criterion, starting salary still varies somewhat among firms. Firms that
pay more at the entry level may be more capable of attracting "the
best" minority graduates or of 146
restricting their recruitment to
traditional white male labor pools.
In addition, the effects of changes in the external labor supply may
vary according to the growth rate of the firm. The legal services
industry is one of the fastest growing industries in the country,147
and most elite law firms have grown significantly over the past several
decades."4 Between 1980 and 1990, the firms in the sample grew
an average of 97%, measured by number of lawyers. 149 However,
some firms grew as little as 4%, while others grew nearly 300%.150

146. Some evidence suggests that firms compete fiercely for the top female and minority law
graduates. SeeWilkins & Gulati, supranote 144, at 545-64. However, evidence also indicates that
law firms are less likely to recruit minorities from the middle of their law school class than whites
in the same academic position. See id.
147. Between 1970 and 1985, the number of lawyers in the United States increased 141%,
compared to 46% in the professions in general and 34% for the entire work force. The value
added to national income by the legal services sector was almost $54 billion in 1986, placing the
legal services industry ahead of the steel industry ($30 billion), the textile industry ($38 billion),
and even the auto industry ($50 billion). See Sander & Williams, supra note 28, at 433-34
(stating that growth trend in legal profession is distinct from growth of other professions as legal
profession has grown three times as fast as other professions since 1970). Analysts attribute the
rapid growth of the legal profession to a variety of causes: on the "supply" side, the baby boom
and the behavior of law schools; on the "demand" side, the rise of in-house counsel and the
increase in business litigation. However, most analysts remain speculative as to the relative
importance of these causes and the nature of the relationship between them. See i. at 478;
Galanter & Palay, supra note 22, at 800 (stating that various factors have contributed to growth
of large law firms but leaving task of defining precise impact of each factor to future research).
148. Although the absolute number of lawyers working in all employment settings has
increased significantly during the past several decades, the growth of large law firms has been
particularly dramatic. In 1950, the nation's largest law firm had 91 lawyers; in 1984, the largest
firm had 697 lawyers and the 50 largest firms had more than 200 lawyers. See NELSON, supra
note 23, at 44-45. Galanter and Palay argue that law firm growth is driven in part by the law
firm incentive structure: Firms must promote a significant proportion of associates in order to
maintain promotion aspirations; but in order to maintain profitability, each new partner must
be balanced by several new associates. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 41, at 33 (stating that
firms that cannot or do not grow will be forced to transform or fail). Thus, firm structure
creates an exponential growth imperative. See iti
149. Over the time period as a whole, the average firm added 7A associates and 3.5 partners
per year. See infra Table 8.
150. In some cases, rapid growth is associated with changes in the level at which firms
reported demographic data to NALP. In particular, firms that grew by establishing branch
offices sometimes changed from reporting demographic data for the firm as a whole (when the
firm maintained only one office) to reporting demographic data for the headquarters only
(when the firm began to maintain more than one office). I flagged this issue in the initial
coding of the data. In calculating annual growth, I excluded firms that changed their reporting
practices from the previous year. Thus, if a firm reported firm-level data through 1985, but in
1986 reported only data for the firm's main office (a typical pattern), I considered that firm
missing for the purposes of calculating growth between 1985 and 1986. I also tested whether
the level of reporting affected my results by creating adummy variable for "datatype," to indicate
whether the data were reported for the whole firm or for the headquarters only. This variable
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Faster-growing firms may recruit more heavily from more recent-and
more integrated-graduate cohorts.
I use multiple regression analysis to estimate the combined effects
of these additional labor market variables."' The "labor market"
models include coefficients for location, starting salary, and growth
rate, in addition to labor supply. In the models for partner composition, I also include a coefficient for "time" to control for the
increasing diversity of associate cohorts. 5
Firm location is measured using dummy variables for each city, with
New York City as the excluded category.51 3 Starting salary is measured as the deviation (in thousands) from the mean starting salary
paid that year in the city in which the firm is located."M Associate
and partner growth are measured by the number of associates or
partners added by the firm the previous year. Table 8 presents
descriptive statistics for the "labor market" variables.
Table 9 reports the results. As these data show, variations in labor
market conditions significantly affect the level of gender and race
integration within the sample firms.

had no significant effect on any of my results; thus I omitted it from the analysis.
151. The results presented in Parts II and III are based on ordinary least squares ("OLS")

regression. For a description of this technique, see GENE M. LUTZ, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL
STATISTICS 202 (1983); and WONNACOTr & WONNACOrr, REGRESSION: A SECOND COURSE IN
STATISTICS 75-102 (1991).
152. It is not necessary to include "time" in the models for associate composition because
changes in the composition of law students correlate almost perfectly with time. The correlation
coefficients for time and the proportion of law school enrollment are .97 for women, .92 for
blacks, .99 for Hispanics, and .94 for Asian Americans. At the associate level, the inclusion of
time does not improve the fit of the model for any of these groups.
153. "Dummy variables" are categorical variables in which the only possible categories are
0 and 1. See WONNACOTr & WONNACOTr, supra note 151, at 104-15 (explaining dummy
variables). For example, a firm located in Chicago is coded "1" for the dummy variable
"Chicago" and "0" for the dummy variables "Los Angeles" and "Washington, D.C." A firm
located in Los Angeles is coded "1" for "Los Angeles" and "0" for the other dummy variables for
location. New York firms are coded "0" for all three location dummies.
154. For example, if the 1985 mean for Los Angeles were $40,000, a Los Angeles firm paying
$42,000 would have a salary deviation of +2.
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics (1980-1990)
Mean
Labor Market (Control) Variables
Chicago (Dummy)
Los Angeles (Dummy)
New York City (Dummy)
Washington, D.C. (Dummy)
Salary Deviation (in Thousands)
Associate Growth (Number of Lawyers)
Partner Growth (Number of Lawyers)
Organizational (Independent) Variables
Size (Number of Lawyers)
Departmentalized (Dummy)
Rotation Not Available (Dummy)
Years To Partner
Ratio (Associates per Partner)
National Branch(es) (Dummy)
International Branch(es) (Dummy)
Corporate Practice (Dummy)
Tax Practice (Dummy)
Banking Practice (Dummy)
Real Estate Practice (Dummy)
General Commercial Practice (Dummy)
Administrative Practice (Dummy)
Antitrust Practice (Dummy)
Government Practice (Dummy)
Labor/Employment Practice (Dummy)
Foreign Trade Practice (Dummy)
Entertainment Practice (Dummy)
Percent Litigation
Dependent Variables
Proportion Women Associates
Proportion Black Associates
Proportion Hispanic Associates
Proportion Asian American Associates
Proportion Women Partners
Proportion Black Partners
Proportion Hispanic Partners
Proportion Asian American Partners

Std. Dev.

.196
.227
.402
.175
-. 234
7.417
3.503

19.158
13.389
4.860

158.227
.842
.464
7.210
1.568
.773
.371
.629
.237
.186
.165
.124
.103
.072
.052
.041
.030
.020
31.415

94.733
-

11.718

.326
.024
.011
.017
.064
.006
.004
.004

.087
.020
.016
.022
.047
.011
.012
.011

.821
.664
-
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Table 9: Effects of Labor Market Determinants
Table 9a: Associate Composition
Proportion
Female
Associates

Variable
Proportion Enrolled
Starting Salary
Chicago
Los Angeles
Washington, D.C.
Associate Growth
Constant
R2
(n)

Proportion
Black
Associates

1.7034***
(16.571)
-. 0012
(-.888)
.0087
(1.198)
-. 0090
(-1.367)
.0432***
(5.759)
-. 0002
(-.906)
-. 3533***
(-8.648)
.2951

.5518**
(2.548)
-. 0002
(-.584)
.0041*
(2.105)
-. 0008
(-.448)
.0137***
(6.825)
-. 0000
(-.187)
-.0069
(-.629)
.0742

(809)

(809)

Proportion

Proportion
Hispanic
Associates
.7522***
(6.464)
-. 0009***
(-3.254)
-. 0004
(-.315)
.0109***
(8.281)
-. 0027
(-1.793)
-.0001*
(-2.089)
-. 0142***
(-3.752)

Asian American
Associates
.5767***
(5.136)
-. 0005
(-1.371)
-.0049**
(-2.507)
.0155***
(8.646)
-.0108***

(-5.330)
.0003
(.507)
.0038
(1.459)

.1595
(809)

.1959
(809)

* p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
Regression coefficients are unstandardized.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.

Table 9: Effects of Labor Market Determinants
Table 9b: Partner Composition

Variable
Proportion Associates
Time
Starting Salary
Chicago
Los Angeles
Washington, D.C.
Partner Growth
Constant

Proportion
Female
Partners

Proportion
Black
Partners

Proportion

.1347***
(7.687)
.0065***
(13.289)
-.0011
(-1.723)
.0126***
(3.424)
.0272***
(8.254)
.0081*
(2.125)
.0007*
(2.420)
-. 5472***
(-13.916)

.0477**
(2.578)
.0003**
(2.955)
.0000
(.266)
.0034***
(3.265)
.0022*
(2.394)
.0064***
(5.988)
.0000
(.036)
-. 0276**
(-2.703)

.1021***
(3.690)
.0002
(1.422)
.0009***
(3.431)
.0027*
(2.367)
.0065***
(6.073)
.0031*
(2.675)
-.0001
(-1.153)
-.0158
(-1.367)

.4082
(809)

.0778
(809)

.0984
(809)

* p <.05
** p <.01
*** p <.001
Regression coefficients are unstandardized.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.

Hispanic
Partners

Proportion
Asian American
Partners
.0858***
(4.357)
.0005***
(4.061)
-.0003
(-1.551)
-.0017
(-1.517)
.0030**
(2.890)
-.0015
(-1.296)
.0000
(.218)
-.0430***
(-3.873)
.0998
(809)
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1.

Effect of location
The most important labor market determinant is the city in which
the firm is located (see Table 9). In general, firms located in Chicago
or Washington, D.C., have significantly higher proportions of black
lawyers than firms located elsewhere,1 55 and Los Angeles firms have
significantly higher proportions of Hispanic and Asian American
lawyers. 5 ' New York firms have the lowest proportions of female
and minority lawyers at both the associate and partnership levels.15 7
2. Effect of salary
Starting salary is significant only in the case of Hispanics. It is
negatively associated with the proportion of Hispanic associates (see
Table 9a), and positively associated with the proportion of Hispanic
partners (see Table 9b).
These findings are difficult to interpret. One explanation is that
higher-paying firms are less likely to hire Hispanics, but more likely
to promote them once hired. Another possibility is that these
findings represent two different types of firms: lower-paying firms that
are more likely to hire Hispanics at the associate level; and higherpaying firms that may be more capable of attracting Hispanic partners
who have proven themselves elsewhere.
These findings also may indicate a failure of the sampling criteria
to control for labor market variation in Los Angeles. Hispanic
representation is higher in Los Angeles firms than in firms located
elsewhere, and starting salaries vary most among the Los Angeles
firms. "58
'
As a result, the firms sampled from Los Angeles may be
more diverse in terms of labor supply than the firms located in other

155. During the time period as a whole, Washington firms had an average of 3.4% black
associates and 1.4% black partners, and Chicago firms had an average of 2.5% black associates
and 0.8% black partners. For New York and Los Angeles firms, the average was approximately
2% black associates and 0.6% black partners.
156. During the time period as a whole, the average Los Angeles firm had 2% Hispanic

associates and more than 3% Asian American associates. Other firms had an average of less
than 1% Hispanic associates and approximately 1.1% Asian American associates. The same
pattern was found at the partnership level. In 1990, the average Los Angeles firm had 1%
Hispanic partners and 1.4% Asian American partners. Other firms averaged approximately 0.4%
Hispanic partners and about 0.4% Asian American partners.
157. For example, in 1990, the average New York firm had only about 8% female partners,
whereas the average in other firms was approximately 12%.
158. In 1990, the standard deviation for starting salary was $1800 in Chicago; $2900 in Los
Angeles; $2000 in New York City, and $1600 in Washington, D.C.
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cities.159 (This explanation also is consistent with the suggestion
that salary effects simply represent two different types of firms.)
These findings also may reflect a more general problem in relying
on the category "Hispanic," which does not correspond to a unified
racial or ethnic group. The Hispanic lawyers in the sample could be
Mexican American, Latin American, South American, Cuban, or
Puerto Rican; and it may be that these different "Hispanic" groups are
concentrated in different parts of the elite firm labor market. Of
course, this could be true of Asian American lawyers as well, and
possibly, of blacks."6
Finally, these findings may be an artifact of the low number of
Hispanic lawyers in the sample firms. Hispanics are the least
represented group in the sample both in terms of absolute numbers
and in terms of proportional representation.'
Furthermore, there
are curious "blips" in the data tracking Hispanic integration at both
the associate and the partnership levels.1 62 I return to this issue at
the end of Part III.
3. Effect of growth
Law firm growth is positively related to the gender composition of
law partners (see Table 9). Otherwise, growth has virtually no effect
on law firm composition, except that it negatively affects the
proportion of Hispanic associates (see Table 9a).163
D. Summary
As these data show, variations in the external labor supply significantly affect the level of gender and race integration within the
sample firms. Changes in the composition of law students over time
and variation among the cities in which the firms are located appear
to be especially important determinants of law firm composition. As
I argue in Part III, however, elite law firms still vary considerably in
their levels of gender and race integration, even controlling for
external labor market conditions. Thus, although external conditions

159. Over-sampling in Los Angeles may partly explain the relatively higher proportions of
minority associates in the sample firms than in large law firms generally. See supra note 132.
160. Throughout the time period of the study, NALP used the category "black" rather than
the category "African-American," which is more ethnically specific. This Study follows NALP's
categorization. See generaly NALP DIRECTORY, supra note 35 (using term "black" throughout).
161. See supra Table 1.
162. See supraTables 1 and 2.
163. If higher-paying firms also are the fastest-growing, this finding is consistent with the
suggestion that the Los Angeles part of the sample is over-inclusive, and that Hispanics are best
represented in the lower-paying, slower-growing firms.
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may set the boundaries for law firm integration, the composition of
elite law firms ultimately is determined by the structural and cultural
characteristics of the individual firm.
III.

ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF LAW FIRM INTEGRATION

Part III analyzes the role of organizational characteristics in
accounting for gender and race variation among firms. That is:
Controlling for labor supply and demand, to what extent do law firm
characteristics affect the level of law firm integration? Which
characteristics are most important? Are their effects the same at
different levels of the law firm hierarchy? Are their effects the same
for different demographic groups?
A.

Structural Characteristics

I first examine the effects of "structural" characteristics such as the
size of the firm, the degree of bureaucratization, and the structure of
the internal promotion hierarchy. I also examine the effects of
geographic structure; that is, whether a firm maintains offices in more
than one city.
1.

Size

Previous research indicates that among law firms generally, firm size
is associated positively with gender"e and race" integration within firms. However, most findings on the relationship between law
firm size and integration are based on a comparison between "large"
(50-100 lawyers) and "small" (2-30 lawyers) firms.'66 As a result, it
is not clear to what extent variations in size continue to matter among
"large" law firms generally. Furthermore, most research on the effect
of firm size does not control for the effects of other structural
characteristics that are associated with size such as bureaucratization,
geographic diversification, and the structure of the internal promotion hierarchy. 67 Thus, it is not clear whether the findings on size
164. For instance, Abel reports that in 1980 women constituted 2.3% of the partners in law
firms with 90 lawyers or more (n=107) but only 1.9% of the partners in law firms with 25-89
lawyers (n=218). SeeABEL, supranote 21, at 97. Similarly, Curran reports that in 1980 all law
firms with 50 lawyers or more had at least one female lawyer, whereas 43.4% of firms with 11-20
lawyers had no female lawyers. CuRRAN Ex AL, supra note 26, at 52.
165. SeeABEL, supranote 21, at 105. Firm size also tends to be associated positively with the
representation of black lawyers. See ihL In 1979, among the law firms in New York, Chicago,
Atlanta, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C., black lawyers constituted only 0.4% of all lawyers
in firms with 30 lawyers or fewer, compared to 1.5% of all lawyers in firms with 50 lawyers or
more. See iU
166. See id. at 105-06 (comparing large firms with small firms).
167. See infra notes 168-69, 177-82, and 188-89 and accompanying text.
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represent the effects of size or the effects of other structural characteristics associated with size.
My analysis addresses these two issues. First, to what extent do
variations in firm size affect the level of gender or race integration
within large law firms? Almost all the firms in the sample would be
considered large relative to the population of law firms as a whole.
Is the effect of size in the sample firms consistent with the effect of
size reported in previous research? Second, to what extent does firm
size affect the level of firm integration, controlling for other structural
characteristics that are associated with size?
I measure firm size according to the number of lawyers in the firm.
In 1990, the average size of the firms in the sample was 211 lawyers,
and the largest firm had 710 lawyers. The average size of the sample
firms over the time period as a whole was 158 lawyers (see Table 8).
2. Bureaucratization
One characteristic associated with increased size is increased
reliance on bureaucratic organizational forms."~ Whereas the
organization of work in elite law firms traditionally has been characterized by informal, fluid work groups, ad-hoc decision-making, and
charisma-based leadership, many elite firms have moved toward
formal departmentalization, strategic planning, and management by
specialized committees.' 69 In addition, although associates in elite
law firms traditionally began their training with a period of "rotation"
among different practice areas, associates today are increasingly likely
to be assigned to particular departments and particular work-groups
immediately upon their arrival. 170
Increased bureaucratization could promote law firm integration in
a number of ways. Bureaucratization may lead to a formalization of
the process by which associates are evaluated. Bureaucratically
structured firms may be more likely than other firms to keep written
records regarding associate performance and to rely upon standardized evaluations when it is time for associate review. Such formalization could increase the flow of information among partners and
decrease reliance on ascriptive criteria for advancement.

168. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 28, at 48 (stating that as firm size increases,
specialization increases (citing NELSON, supra note 23, at 147)).
169. See id. at 48-49 (discussing increased specialization and departmentalization within large
law firms resulting from increased firm size and corporate case load); NELSON, supra note 23,
at 7 (stating that bureaucratization of law firms results from changing function of law in society).
170. See NEISON, supranote 23, at 150-53 (examining number of attorneys "channeled" into
fields of practice).
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Bureaucratization also may lead to a formalization of the process by
which work is distributed among associates. Rather than allowing
individual partners to recruit associates directly, bureaucratically
structured firms may be more likely to establish a work assignment
committee or to designate an assigning partner.17 1 The use of a
formal assignment system may decrease the propensity toward
lawyers' access
informal "tracking" and increase women and minority
72
to choice training opportunities within the firm.'
On the other hand, bureaucratization may have no such positive
effects because the formalization of internal processes may not alter
substantive results. Recent lawsuits against professional firms suggest
that the use of written evaluations is no guarantee against the
articulation of gender stereotypes or the discriminatory evaluation of
female partnership candidates. 173
Similarly, the interview data
suggest that the establishment of a formal assignment system does not
necessarily prevent informal tracking; in some firms, powerful
partners routinely bypass work assignment systems and directly recruit
the associates with whom they want to work ("poaching"). 74

171. See id. at 150-58.
172. The interview data suggest that the use of a formal assignment system may make the
distribution of work and training opportunities more meritocratic:
[In my firm] if you want an associate you must go to the associate assignment partner

and say I have this kind of matter; here are my time constraints; it's immediate but it's
not urgent; and I need this kind of person. Ayoung associate [or] an older associate you can always express preferences but it doesn't count for much.... The person
who is responsible for getting the associate is the assigning partner. Poaching is not
permitted. Poaching is not done .... [The way that "superstars" get identified] is by
doing good work for a lot of different people. Working for a lot of people counts for
a lot at our firm. Working for one person is a negative. (WFP2).
173. For instance, in Pice Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 229 (1990), a female partnership
candidate in a large, bureaucratized accounting firm was told that to make partner she should
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wearjewelry." IM.at 235. Her written evaluations included comments such as
"she overcompensate(s) for being a woman," and "[she has] matured from a tough-talking
somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing
lady ptr candidate." Id. In Ezold v. Wolf, Block, 751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990), a female
partnership candidate won a sex discrimination suit against a large Philadelphia law firm after
the district court compared the largely positive written comments in her file (e.g., "exceptionally
good," "top notch," "a hard worker") with critical comments from the files of men who were
promoted (e.g., "lazy," "slick," and "he simply disappears without notice, sometimes for days at
a time"). See id.at 1182-88. The Ezold ruling was overturned on appeal. See Ezold v. Wolf,
Block, 983 F.2d 509, 548 (3d Cir. 1992).
174. Consider the following accounts from female associates in two different firms:
We have a formal [assignment system] but it doesn't work .... The partners had
ignored the stocking partners. They're supposed to go through the stocking partners
... they weren't doing that. They were jumping on associates. So as a result, some
associates were just doing too much work on [x]-the kind of work you want to
do-and some associates weren't doing the kind of work they wanted to do at all.
(WFA1).
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In fact, to the extent that partners do rely on gender or race-based
evaluative criteria, bureaucratization simply may formalize informal
patterns of workplace segregation. Like informal work groups, formal
departments may vary according to the desirability of the work and
the power and prestige of the supervising partners. 7 5 By hiring

associates directly into departments and not allowing rotation among
structuraldepartments, bureaucratically structured firms may establish
176
tracking.
informal
through
establish
firms
ly what other

I investigate whether the degree of bureaucratization affects the
level of gender or race integration within the sample firms. I measure
the degree of bureaucratization according to whether the firm is
departmentalized and whether the firm requires specialization by
department ("No rotation"). Among the firms in the sample, 84%
are departmentalized, and 46% require specialization by department

(see Table 8).
3.

The structure of the internal promotion hierarchy

Firm size also tends to be associated with the length and competitiveness of the internal promotion hierarchy. For example, in most
large law firms the number of years it takes to make partner is
increasing. 177 Rather than making partnership decisions in the sixth
or seventh year of practice, many firms wait until the eighth, ninth,
or even tenth year of practice. 78 Furthermore, in many large law
firms the associate-partner ratio also is increasing. 7 9 Among the
fifty largest law firms in 1986, the average number of associates per

One problem with the assigning partner system ... is often the assigning partner is
somebody who is pretty low on the totem pole, because those are the people who get
that kind of routine administrative responsibility .... So what ends up happening is
... a partner would go over the head of the assigning partner and come to the
associate ... and the assigning partner didn't have, you know, the "umph" to say to
this very senior partner, "I'm terribly sorry but you know you have to go through
me ...." (WFA2).
175. See NELSON, supra note 23, at 152.
176. See id. at 157. According to Nelson:
The leaders of law firms have always controlled the careers of their juniors. This
control was exercised more bluntly in the paternalistic era of law firm organization
when a few leading partners called the shots. Today firms manage the careers of new
members through the apparatus of committees, departments, and assignment partners.
Id.
177. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 28, at 63 (citing NELSON, supra note 23, at 141).
178. See id.
179. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 22, at 784-90 (suggesting that elite law firms try to
maintain high associate-partner ratios in order to ensure profitability). One partner Nelson

interviewed said that every time an associate is promoted, "'the firm must hire four new
associates, one to replace the lost associate, and three to work for the new partner."' NELSON,
supranote 23, at 141.
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partner increased 28% between 1960 and 1985, from 1.16 to 1.49.180
This trend is especially evident in New York City firms, where the
associate-partner ratio traditionally has been highest"'1
The length and "breadth" of the internal promotion hierarchy may
have a significant effect on the level of gender and race integration
among partners. First, the length of the partnership track directly
affects the supply of associates who are eligible for promotion. The
longer it takes to make partner, the longer it takes for diversity among
associates to be reproduced at the partnership level. As a result, elite
law firms with longer partnership tracks may be less integrated at the
partnership level than elite law firms offering earlier opportunities for
promotion.
In addition, some evidence indicates that higher associate-partner
ratios may mean lower promotion rates for associates."8 2 Because
firms with lower promotion rates will promote fewer lawyers from
younger, more integrated associate cohorts, firms with high associatepartner ratios may be less integrated at the partnership level than
firms with low ratios.
The structure of the internal promotion hierarchy may be
particularly important in determining the level of gender integration
within firms. As a number of writers have noted, the demanding
nature of elite firm practice is especially burdensome for women, who
continue to bear primary responsibility for child-rearing. 3 Long
hours, frequent travel, and firms' reluctance to allow part-time
employment'" all contribute to consistently higher attrition rates

180. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 41, at 54.
181. See id. at 55. Galanter and Palay report that among the firms in New York City, the
average number of associates per partner increased by 34%between 1960 and 1985---from 1.36
to 1.82. In firms outside of New York City, the average increased by only 12%-from 1.05 to
1.18. See id.; see also NELSON, supra note 23, at 9 (discussing "New York system").
182. In New York, for example, the promotion rate was 25.1% for associates hired between
1968 and 1970, but only 18.8% for associates hired between 1978 and 1980. See Edward A.
Adams, Longer PartnershipOdds at N.Y Firms, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 1989, at 1 (examing sample of
large New York City law firms); see also NELSON, supranote 23, at 76-77 (observing that many
large law firms have low promotion rates); Daniel Wise, Psst! Wanna Make Partner?,NAT'L LJ.,
Oct. 26, 1987, at 1 (discussing difficulties in making partner). But see GALANrER & PALAY, supra
note 28, at 103 (finding that proportion of associates who make partner has remained relatively
stable over time and suggesting that evidence of "lower promotion rates" primarily reflects
lengthening of partnership track). See id.
183. See, ag., EPsTEIN, supra note 130, at 206-12 (examining difficulties faced by women
attorneys with families); Jill Abramson & Barbara Hackman Franklin, Harvard Law '74: Are
Women Catching Up?, AM. LAW., May 1983, at 79 (evaluating success rate of women from
Harvard's Class of 1974); Menkel-Meadow, supranote 31, at 295 (enunciating difference between
"career track" and "mommy track").
184. See EPSTEIN, supranote 130, at 206-12 (discussing difficulties that some women attorneys
have working long hours due to family responsibilities); NELSON, supra note 23, at 184-88
(analyzing number of hours attorneys work); see also infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
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for women associates than for men. 5 This difference may be
exacerbated in firms with longer, more competitive promotion
hierarchies. As a result, such firms may have lower proportions of
female lawyers.
I examine whether the structure of the internal promotion
hierarchy affects the level of gender or race integration within the
sample firms. I measure the structure of the internal promotion
hierarchy according to the number of years it takes to make partner
and the associate-partner ratio. Among the firms in the sample, the
length of the partnership track varies from four to nine years with an
average of 7.21 years. The associate-partner ratio varies from .55 to
3.77, with an average of 1.57 (see Table 8).
4.

Geographic diversification

Finally, the size of elite law firms also is associated with their
geographic structure. Until about 1970, most elite law firms maintained only one office and were identified closely with the city in
which the firm was located.186 In the 1970s and 1980s, however,
many elite law firms began to establish "branch" offices, and since
1980, many firms have moved to a genuine multi-city practice,
maintaining numerous offices both in the United States and
abroad. 87 Large law firms are more likely than small law firms to
maintain offices in more than one U.S. city"s and may be more
likely to maintain international offices. 8 9
Law firms that maintain offices in more than one city may tend to
be more integrated than law firms that do not. First, many of the
benefits associated with increased size also may be associated with
geographic diversification. For instance, size tends to have a positive
effect on organizations' compliance with antidiscrimination law
because increased size makes organizations more visible."9 For the

185. See NELSON, supranote 23, at 140 (stating that 40% of all associates and 44% ofwomen
associates leave their firms).
186. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 28, at 47.

187. See id. Initially, most branch offices were located in Washington, D.C.-in 1980, 178

firms had branch offices there.

See id. As "branching" activity increased, however, the

proportion of branch offices located in Washington, D.C., declined. See id.
188. See id In 1980, 87% of the 100 largest law firms had offices in more than one city,
compared to 62% of law firms with 50 lawyers or more. See ia2; see also CuRRAN ET AL., supranote
26, at 53 (stating that of firms with 50 lawyers or more in 1980, 37.6% had offices in one
location, 32.8% had offices in two locations, 16.7% had offices in three locations, and 7.3% had
offices in four locations).
189. Although there are no comparable data for smaller firms, in 1980 the 20 largest firms
in New York City had a total of 39 international branches. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note
28, at 48.

190. See Edelman, Legal Environments, supranote 13, at 1408.
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same reason, geographic diversification may increase law firms'
compliance with antidiscrimination law.
Size also tends to have a positive effect on the "inclusiveness" of law
firm recruitment in that larger firms tend to recruit a larger portion
of the class from a larger number of schools.'
Geographic diversification may lead to expanded recruitment as well: Firms that
maintain offices in more than one city may recruit students from a
wider variety of law schools than firms with only one office.
The firm's geographic structure also may affect the racial composition of the firm's clients. In particular, firms that maintain international offices may have a more racially diverse client base than firms
that do not.192 The racial composition of clients may affect both the
demand for and the success of minority associates and partners. 9 3
As a result, law firms that maintain international offices may tend to
be more racially integrated than firms that do not.
I investigate the effects of geographic structure on the level of
gender and race integration within the sample firms. I measure
geographic structure according to: (1) whether the firm maintains
more than one U.S. office; and (2) whether the firm maintains one
or more international offices. Among the firms in the sample, 77%
have more than one U.S. office and 37% have at least one international office (see Table 8).
B.

Client Characteristics

I also examine whether the nature of the firm's client base affects
the level of gender or race integration. Personal relationships with
clients are critical to lawyers' advancement within elite law firns. The
most powerful partners are the "rainmakers"-those who are
personally responsible for attracting major clients. 94 The ability to

191. See NELSON, supranote 23, at 132-33 (describing rise in number of graduates of local
or regional law schools hired by large law firms); see also Galanter & Palay, supra note 41, at 53
(noting that current trend toward hiring associates based on school performance rather than
social status increases firm inclusiveness).
192. For instance, firms that maintain offices in Mexico City may have more Hispanic clients;
fir-ms with offices in Tokyo or Hong Kong may have more Asian clients.
193. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (discussing importance of client
demographics).
194. See NELSON, supranote 23, at 277-78. "The leading partners of the law firm are those
lawyers who are personally responsible for major clients." Id at 278. "If they lose a client or
if their field dries up, they will eventually lose their position of leadership to partners with a
growing clientele." I.
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attract and satisfy clients96also affects promotion decisions19 and
individual compensation.
The importance of clients to a lawyer's success suggests that the
level of integration within elite law firms may depend significantly on
the level of integration among the firm's clients. First, the gender
and race characteristics of clients may affect the distribution of work
and other advancement opportunities within the firm. For example,
male clients may be more likely than female clients to object to the
assignment of a female lawyer.19 7 Similarly, minority clients may be
more likely than white clients to request the assignment of minority
lawyers. 19 Even when clients do not express a preference, firm
leaders may "track" lawyers according to clients' demographic
characteristics. 199

195. See id. at 55-56 (discussing need for lawyers who will bring in new clients); see also
GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 28, at 52-53 (noting that "standing within the firm depends
increasingly on how much business a partner brings in").
196. See NESON, supra note 23, at 199 (comparing income increases of lawyers who bring
in new clients to those who do not); see also GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 28, at 52-53
(discussing trend toward reduction of salary for failure to bring in new business).
197. The interview data suggest that the expression of such preferences is not uncommon
and that if the client is an important one, firms tend to acquiesce. Consider the following
reports from male lawyers at two different firms:
We had a very important client who objected to a young very capable woman partner
arguing cases in the court of appeals, [and he] asserted he wanted a more senior male
partner to make the argument. In our view the younger partner was more capable...
and we accepted the lie that it was seniority rather than gender that caused the request
and we acceded to it because it was a very important long term client ....
We were
not happy with ourselves but that's what we did ....
(WMP3).
We had a case where ... the star wimess from our side did not get along at all with
the woman associate that was assigned to the case ....
I understand it was because
she was a woman. He had this very macho sort of to hell with them all attitude. She
was trying very carefully to be sort of a deliberate lawyer, and they just did not get
along at all. And the case sort of rested on this guy's testimony, and knowing that he
was going to have to be prepared for this trial by this woman, and then questioned on
the stand by this woman, the chemistry was very important and I think the partner of
his own initiative replaced her with a man. (WMA1).
198. A lack of exposure to direct client contact traditionally has been cited as one of the
biggest barriers to internal advancement of black and Hispanic associates. See Rita Henley
Jensen, Minorities Didn't Share in Firm Growth, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 19, 1990, at 1, 35 (examining
increase of women and minority attorneys in law firms); Claudia MacLachlan & Rita Henley
Jensen, ProgressGlacialforWomen, Minorities,NAT'L Lj.,Jan. 27,1992, at 1, 32-34 (observing slow
partnership rate for women and minorities). However, recent accounts suggest that minority
clients increasingly are pressuring law firms to staff their matters with minority attorneys. See
David A. Maister, Helping PartnersImprove, AM. LAW., Oct. 1992, at 8 1-32 (stressing importance
of collegial law firm environment to help all members of firm attain success).
199. For instance, an Asian American lawyer interviewed in TheAmerican Laugerreported that
other Asian American lawyers had complained to her that they were "being slotted for East Asian
practice." Maister, supra note 198, at 31. Although that was her own field by choice, she said,
"There are a lot of Asian-Americans who really have no interest in Asia-they just want to be
general litigation or corporate lawyers." Id.
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The gender and race composition of a firm's clients also may affect
the ability of women and minority lawyers to generate new business.
Lawyer-client relationships tend to be formed through social and
professional contacts, and most evidence suggests that clients prefer
lawyers who are socially similar to them. 2' ° As a result, law firms
with well-established, integrated client bases may offer increased
20
"rainmaking" opportunities for women and minority lawyers. '
Characteristics of the firm's client base also may affect the firm's
responsiveness to federal antidiscrimination law. For instance,
Edelman finds that firms serving public clients, such as state or
municipal government, tend to be more responsive than firms serving
predominantly private clients, such as corporations or banks. 20 2 As
a result, law firms that serve public clients may tend to be more
integrated than law firms that primarily serve private corporations.0 3
I examine whether characteristics of the firm's client base affect the
level of gender or race integration within the sample firms. I measure
client base according to: (1) the firm's primary practice areas; and
(2) the percentage of the firm's practice devoted to litigation.
1. Primary practice areas
All of the firms in the sample are "general practice" firms in that
they provide a fairly wide range of legal services; however, firms
concentrate in different areas. Based on the "areas of specialization"

200. See NELSON, supranote 23, at 130; see also HEINz & LAUMANN, supranote 129, at 330-32
(examining correlation between levels of client similarity and areas of practice and noting levels
ofsimilarity where litigation is involved); KANTER, supranote 10, at 47-49 (discussing preferences
for socially similar co-workers in managerial setting).
201. Recent evidence suggests that the increase in Asian and Latin American clients has
improved business development opportunities for Asian American and Hispanic lawyers. See
Kim Homer, Ronquillo Exits Ronquillo & DeWolfto Start His Own Firm,TEX. LAw., May 27, 1995,
at 4 (discussing success of Ronquillo's international trade practice built around Mexican and
Latin American clients); Lorien L.M.M. Golaski, Wat's in an Identity? Law Firms Must Have
Something to Sell, ILL. LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 1995, at 1 (describing one firm's market niche among
Hispanic clients); Mario Shao, Diverse in Many Ways, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 28, 1996, at Al (describing
benefits of a diverse partnership for attracting business from diverse clienteles).
202. See generally Edelman, Symbolic Structures, supranote 13, at 1548-49 (examining effect of
proximity to public sphere on private firms' responses to federal antidiscrimination law);
Edelman, LegalEnvironments,supranote 13, at 1413-15 (stating that formal structural protections
against discrimination tend to occur first in organizations linked to public sphere).
203. Law firms with labor and employment practices also may tend to be more integrated
because of firm members' increased awareness of and commitment to equal employment
guarantees. As one partner said of the high level of integration in his firm: "It's all pretty
simple.... We specialize in employment and labor law, and determined early on that we
wanted to set a good example for our clients and other firms." MacLachan &Jensen, supra
note 198, at 34. On the other hand, many elite law firms in the labor and employment area
serve clients from the management side and may be more committed to the preservation of
traditional managerial prerogatives. See Heinz & Laumann, supra note 129, at 54 (concluding
that lawyers' political and social commitments tend to mirror those of clients they serve).
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portion of the NALP survey in which firms specify the number of

lawyers working in each area of practice, I identified the top two
practice areas for each firm.

I initially coded for twenty-three possible primary practice areas.0 4

The categories used in .the final analysis represent the eleven most

common primary practice areas (in descending order):205 corporate
and securities; tax; banking and finance; real estate; general commercial; administrative; antitrust; government;2 6 labor and employment;

international and foreign trade; and entertainment.207 I use separate dummy variables to represent each of these eleven areas (see
Table 8).2"
2. Percent litigation

I also include a measure for the percentage of the firm's practice
devoted to litigation. This measure is included because the litigation

field tends to present a special case for career development within
elite law firms.20 9

First, litigation services tend to be associate-intensive. Much of the
preparatory work is routine; yet complex cases can occupy a large
number of associates for significant periods of time. Thus, litigation

204. These 23 categories covered each of the different primary practice areas reported by
the sample firms. The categories were: corporate and securities; banking and finance; tax;
international and foreign trade; probate and estate planning;, real estate; labor and employment;
employee benefits; health law; intellectual property (including patent and trademark);
government contracts; legislation (i.e., lobbying); state and municipal government; administrative regulation; energy and environmental; entertainment; criminal (white collar); antitrust and
trade regulation; general commercial; products liability and insurance; bankruptcy and business
reorganization; communications; and litigation.
205. In determining the most common practice areas, I did not count litigation. Rather,
percent litigation" is included as a separate variable. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying
text (discussing reasons for treating litigation as "special case" when assessing practice area
integration).
206. The "government" category covers firms whose top two practice areas include either
government contracts" or "state and municipal government."
207. Entertainment was cited as a primary practice area by only two firms, placing it, in terms
of frequency, on a par with bankruptcy (three firms), products liability (two firms), and energy
and environmental (two firms). However, my initial investigation revealed that the presence of
a large entertainment practice has a significant positive effect on the proportion of black
lawyers, whereas the other practice areas had no significant effect on law firm composition.
Thus, I included entertainment as a dummy variable.
208. A firm is coded "1" for both of its top two practice areas. Thus, if a firm's top two
practice areas are "corporate and securities" and "banking," the firm is coded "1" for both
.corporate" and "banking," and "0" for the other practice area variables. In some cases, one of
the firms' top practice areas is not represented in the final eleven categories. In these cases, the
for example, a firm's top two
firm is coded "1" only for the practice area that is represented. If,
practice areas are "corporate and securities" and "products liability," the firm is coded "1" for
corporate" and "0" for all other categories.
209. See NELSON,supra note 23, at 153-54 (stating that rates of departure and mobility vary
greatly between attorneys in litigation and attorneys in other fields).
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may limit associates' contact with clients more than other types of
elite firm practice."'
In addition, the litigation field tends to offer fewer opportunities
for associate advancement."
Clients want "name" litigators to
argue their cases; and many firms recruit reputed litigators laterally
from government or from other firms." 2 As a result, litigation
associates cannot count on becoming litigation partners; the litigation
field thus has one of the highest associate attrition rates.2 13
Because of these undesirable characteristics, Nelson finds that firms
must "channel" associates into litigation to a greater extent than other
fields in order to meet service demands. 4 Some evidence suggests
that women and minority associates may be particularly likely to be
channelled into litigation and other practice areas with less client
contact. 215 At the partnership level, however, Nelson's work suggests
that litigation may be one of the least integrated practice areas
because of clients' increased emphasis on lawyers' ascriptive characteristics and related qualities such as appearance and personal authority:
"In the litigation fields we find the greatest differences in the tasks
and responsibilities of partners and associates."2 16
Given the potential idiosyncrasies associated with litigation practice,
I controlled for the percentage of each firm's practice devoted to
litigation. The average firm in the sample devotes about thirty
percent of its practice to litigation services (see Table 8).
3.

A caveat

Primary practice areas are only an indirect measure of clients'
demographic characteristics. Although most areas of practice are tied
closely to identifiable client groups (corporate practice is associated
with corporations, banking practice is associated with banks, etc.), the
gender and race composition of these client groups is only generally
estimable. Thus, although most banks are run by white men, all banks
may not be. Similarly, although most local governments are more
diverse than most banks, some may not be.

210. See iU. (noting that litigation associates talk to clients less frequently than other
associates).
211. See id. at 155.
212. See id.
213. See id at 153 (stating that nearly one-third of lawyers who enter litigation field depart,
but that almost all lawyers who enter office fields remain).
214. See id. at 155-56.
215. See Maclachlan &Jensen, supra note 198, at 31.
216. NELSON, supranote 23, at 180.
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Furthermore, even if a firm practices in a particular area, the data
do not reveal whether particular lawyers in the firm actually practice
in that area. For instance, although firms with a significant entertainment practice many tend to have higher proportions of black
partners, I cannot measure directly whether the black partners in
these firms actually practice in the entertainment area.
Nevertheless, as I argue below, the effects of practice areas on the
gender and race composition of the sample firms allow for a fairly
consistent interpretation along demographic lines. Thus, despite the
flaws in my measure, the results are highly suggestive.
C. Methods
I use multiple regression analysis to estimate the effects of
organizational characteristics on the gender and race composition of
the sample firms.217 As in Part II, I use group-specific measures of
composition (proportion female, proportion black, proportion
Hispanic, proportion Asian American),2' and I distinguish between
associates and partners.
I measure the representation of each group according to its
number in the firm divided by the total number of associates or
partners. For example, the "proportion of female associates" is
measured as the number of female associates in the firm divided by
the total number of associates in the firm.1 9 In order to test the
effects of organizational characteristics, I control for changes in law
school enrollment, as well as for other labor market determinants
such as location, starting salary, and growth rate.
D. Resu/ts
The results indicate that organizational characteristics significantly
affect the gender and race composition of the sample firms, particularly at the partnership level. However, different characteristics affect
different groups. The most important organizational determinants of

217. The results presented here are based on OLS estimates, as in Part II. See supranote 151
and accompanying text. These models do not take into account the panel structure of my data,
in which each firm is observed at 11 time points, and thus do not correct for autocorrelation
between the "organizational" variables. The results presented here, however, are consistent with

generalized least squares ("GLS") estimates obtained using a model with "fixed effects." See
WILLIAM H. GREENE, LIMDEP USER'S MANUAL AND REFERENcE GUIDE VERSION 6.0, at 293-327
(1987) (explaining fixed and random effects models). See generally WILuIAM H. GREENE,
ECONOMERIc ANALySIS, at ch. 16 (2d ed. 1993).
218. My analysis focused on these four groups because these are the categories used on the
NALP survey form. See supranote 21 and accompanying text.
219. See supraTable 8 (providing descriptive statistics for dependent variables based on time
period as whole).
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gender integration are the structure of the internal promotion
hierarchy and the geographic structure of the firm. The most
important organizational determinants of integration for black and
Asian American lawyers are the geographic structure of the firm and
the nature of the firm's client base.
Hispanic lawyers present a special case for analysis. The most
important organizational determinants at the associate level are the
geographic structure of the firm and the nature of the firm's client
base, as is the case for black and Asian American lawyers. However,
at the partnership level, the structure of the internal promotion
hierarchy also becomes important, as is the case for women.
Despite this complication, I argue that the organizational determinants of gender and race integration tend to be different, with gender
integration being more dependent on the removal of structural
barriers and racial integration being more dependent on the removal
of social and cultural barriers. I relate the idiosyncratic findings for
Hispanic partners to other inconsistencies in my results for Hispanics
generally.
1.

The effects of structural characteristics

Size: As suggested above, size is significantly correlated with other
structural variables in the analysis (see Table 10).220 Controlling for
these other structural characteristics, size generally has a negative
effect on the level of racial integration within the sample firms (see
Tables Ila and 1ib); and at the partnership level, size also has a
significant negative effect on the level of gender integration (see
Table 1Ib). In general, therefore, the effects of size reported here
are the opposite of those suggested by previous research.

220. In general, these relationships are as predicted: size is positively associated with
departmentalization, the length of the partnership track, the associate-partner ratio, and the
likelihood of geographic diversification.
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Table 10: Correlations Between Structural Variables
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Size
Departments
No Rotation
Years to Partner
Associate/Parmer Ratio
National Branch(es)
International Branch(es)

p <.05

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

.06*
-.06*
.33**
.60**
.33**
.54**

.34**
-. 04
.13**
.24**
.10"*

-. 08*
-. 00
.06
-. 16**

.50**
.11**
.41**

.19*
.54**

** p <.01

(6)

.06

(2-tailed)

Table 11a: Effects of Structural Characteristics (Associates)

Variable
Proportion Enrolled
Starting Salary

Proportion
Female
Associates
1.6521***
(14.955)
-. 0008

(-.559)
Chicago
Los Angeles
Washington, D.C.

-. 0063
(-.562)
-. 0213*
(-2.374)
.0446***

(4.345)
Associate Growth
Size (in Hundreds)
Years to Partner
Associate/Parmer Ratio
Departments
No Rotation
National Branch(es)

-. 0003
(-1.523)
.0084
(1.847)
-. 0109**
(-2.542)
.0026
(.350)
.0029
(.338)
-. 0182***
(-3.213)
.0230**

(3.125)
International Branch(es)
(Constant)

-. 0328***
(-4.585)
-2.637***

(-5.063)
R2
R2 Change
F (R2 Change)
(n)

.481
.0473
7.7988***
(766)

Proportion
Black
Associates

Proportion
Hispanic
Associates

.7268**
(3.000)
-. 0003

(6.683)
-. 0008**

(-.704)

.0008
(.256)
-. 0031
(-1.239)
.0140***
(4.908)
-. 0000
(-.250)
.0004
(.349)
-. 0018
(-1.543)
-. 0019
(-.933)
-. 0003
(-.140)
-. 0021
(-1.335)
.0055**
(2.711)
.0003
(.174)
-. 0020
(-.140)
.0986
.0153
1.8324
(766)

* p <.05
**p <.01
p < .001
Regression coefficients are unstandardized.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.

.8580***
(-2.945)
.0040
(1.791)
.0129***
(7.104)
-. 0017

(-.824)
-. 0000
(-1.325)
-. 0030***
(-3.244)
-. 0003
(-.401)
.0020
(1.324)
-. 0020

(-1.173)
-. 0001
(-.067)
.0005

(.358)
.0062**
(4.310)
-. 0160*
(-2.129)
.1884
.0269
3.5601***
(766)

Proportion
Asian American
Associates
.7072***
(5.784)
-.0002
(-.666)
-.0052
(-1.705)
.0164***
(6.664)
-.0072**
(-2.552)
-.0000
(-.342)
-. 0008
(-.617)
-. 0013
(-1.149)
.0002
(.083)
-.0033
(-1.412)
.0008
(.531)
.0093***
(4.638)
.0064***
(3.268)
.0041
(.447)
.2373
.0340
4.8006**
(766)
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Table llb: Effects of Structural Characteristics (Partners)

Variable
Proportion Associates
Time
Starting Salary
Chicago
Los Angeles
Washington, D.C.
Partner Growth
Size (in Hundreds)
Years to Partner
Associate/Partner Ratio
Departments
No Rotation
National Branch(es)
International Branch(es)
(Constant)
R2
R2 Change
F (R2 Change)
(n)

Proportion
Female
Partners

Proportion
Black
Partners

Proportion
Hispanic
Partners

Proportion
Asian American
Partners

.1242***
(6.934)
.0080***
(15.498)
-. 0009
(-1.384)
.0010
(.186)
.0139**
(3.152)
.0150**
(2.938)
.0006*
(2.182)
-. 0057**
(-2.473)
-. 0147***
(-6.917)
.0003
(.098)
-. 0033
(-.773)
.0010
(.347)
.0294***
(8.057)
.0135***
(3.793)
-.5804***
(-13.566)

.0414*
(2.250)
.0004***
(3.324)
.0001
(.591)
.0063***
(4.029)
.0040***
(3.222)
.0111***
(7.650)
-.0001
(-.949)
-. 0003
(-.402)
-. 0004
(-.619)
.0013
(1.253)
.0037**
(3.067)
-. 0016*
(-2.033)
.0027**
(2.661)
.0012
(1.162)
-. 0396***
(-3.439)

.0982***
(3.464)
.0003*
(2.341)
.0009***
(3.973)
-.0021
(-1.225)
.0009
(.603)
-. 0022
(-1.396)
-. 0001
(-.670)
.0001
(.140)
-. 0031***
(-4.543)
-. 0037***
(-3.214)
.0004
(.320)
-. 0025**
(-2.848)
-. 0040***
(-3.450)
.0017
(1.479)
.0051
(.393)

.0618**
(2.981)
.0008***
(5.679)
-. 0002
(1.061)
-. 0040*
(-2.304)
.0015
(1.053)
-.0016
(-1.006)
.0000
(.526)
-. 0019**
(-2.660)
-. 0003
(-.923)
-. 0011
(-.998)
-. 0017
(-1.281)
.0010
(1.104)
.0053***
(4.539)
.0025*
(2.213)
-.0646***
(-4.982)

.4860
.0705
14.7438***
(766)

.1335
.0326
4.0440***
(766)

.1969
.0957
12.7982***
(766)

.1240
.0329
4.0377***
(766)

* p <.05
**p <.ol
*** p <.001
Regression coefficients are unstandardized.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Degree of Bureaucratization: Overall, increased bureaucratization also
tends to have a negative effect on the level of gender and race
integration within the sample firms (see Tables Ila and lb). In
particular, firms that do not allow rotation tend to be less integrated
at both the associate and partnership levels. The exception to this
general negative effect is that departmentalization has a significant
positive effect on the representation of black partners (see Table 11 b).
The overall negative effect of bureaucratization suggests that
increased bureaucratization may operate to increase the level of
gender and race segregation within firms. The significant negative
effects on the representation of black and Hispanic partners suggest
that segregation of black and Hispanic associates may be a particular
problem. This interpretation is consistent with recent journalistic
accounts describing increasing racial segmentation within large law
firms.221 It also might be consistent with the positive effect of
departmentalization on the representation of black partners: perhaps
in firms with higher proportions of black partners, all the black
partners tend to be concentrated within a particular practice area. I
will return to this finding in the discussion of client base below.22 2
The Structureof the InternalPromotionHierarchy: The number of years
it takes to make partner has a significant negative effect on the
representation of female lawyers at both the associate and partnership
levels (see Tables 1la and 11b). The length of the partnership track
also has a significant negative effect on representation of Hispanic
partners (see Table I1ib).
This finding could represent a "cohort" effect: that is, the longer
it takes to make partner, the longer it takes for younger, more diverse
associate cohorts to advance to the partnership level. If this finding
were the result of a cohort effect, however, then length of the
partnership track should have a significant negative effect on the level
of partner integration generally, not just on the representation of
women and Hispanics. Furthermore, the cohort interpretation does
not account for the effect of the length of the partnership track on
the level of gender integration among associates.
A better interpretation of this finding is that the length of the
partnership track negatively affects the level of gender integration
within the sample firms, for reasons stemming primarily from
women's increased family and child care responsibilities. 2 The fact

221.
222.
certain
223.

See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (discussing positive correlation between
practice areas and representation of minority partners).
See Note, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1274-75 (1982).
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that the length of the partnership track affects women's representation at the associate level suggests that female lawyers may voluntarily
"select out" of firms where advancement is a more distant possibility.
This interpretation is supported by the interview data, which
indicate that conflicts between work and family are particularly
burdensome for women seeking partnership. For example, although
most law firms offer maternity leave, many women are afraid to take
it for fear of being branded "uncommitted." As one female partner
reported:
We did a focus group on this issue and we asked the men at the
table whether they would take paternity leave if the firm instituted
it and they all said, "Oh no, we couldn't possibly do that, you know,
if it was found out, everybody would think you weren't committed."
And then we said, 'Well how many of you have kids?" And they all
raised their hands. And we said, "Well, you know, did any of you
take off around the birth of your kids," and they all said "Of
course we did." 'Well, what did you do?" 'Well, we took vacation,
we took sick time ...." I mean they all had taken time off but
none of them felt safe saying that they wanted paternity leave
(WFPI).
Those women who do take maternity leave may suffer economic
penalties in addition to delayed promotion. As the same female
partner recounts:
The year I had my son I took three months. That year I got
knocked from the top bonus to the second [bonus] .... No one

could give me a reason why I got [the] second bonus. No one
could give me a single criticism on a single evaluation, a single
complaint from a partner or client, anything .... No one would

admit it was because I took a three-month maternity leave, but that
was the answer .... Because every other woman who had had
children, taken maternity leave, would go back a year .... The
only reason I was on the eight-year track and not the seven- was
because I took three months off and had one son (WFP1).
This gender-based interpretation admittedly does not incorporate
the negative effect of the length of the partnership track on the
representation of Hispanic partners. However, one possibility is that
most of the Hispanic partners in my sample are women. Another
possibility is that the structure of the internal promotion hierarchy
2 24
affects women and Hispanics for different reasons.

224.

The effects of the associate-partner ratio tend to support the conclusion that Hispanic

lawyers present a special case for the purposes of this analysis. In general, the associate-partner
ratio has a slightly positive effect on the level of gender and race integration among associates,
except in the case of black associates where the negative effect is negligible. See supra Table 1la
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Geographic Structure: In general, geographic diversification has a
significant positive effect on the level of gender and race integration
within the sample firms (see Tables 11a and 11b). Except in the case
of Hispanics, the presence of at least one other U.S. office significantly improves the level of gender and race integration among both
associates and partners. And except in the case of women associates,
the presence of at least one international office also tends to have
positive effects (see Tables 11a and 11b).
These positive effects of geographic diversification are consistent
with the hypotheses advanced above, regarding the size-like benefits
of a more diversified geographic structure. 2 5 However, the effects
of having an international office suggest that the racial composition
of clients may be important as well. For instance, the presence of an
international office has a significant positive effect on the representation of Hispanic and Asian American associates, but not on black
associates (see Table 11a). Because international offices are not
commonly located in African countries, 228 or in other countries with
significant black populations, this pattern suggests that the positive
effects of international diversification may be related to the racial
composition of international clients.
This client-centered interpretation also is consistent with the
negative effect of international diversification on the representation
of female associates, in that female associates may face increased
gender bias from foreign clients. I return to the findings on
geographic structure in the discussion of client base below.
2.

The effects of client characteristics

The nature of the firm's client base significantly affects the racial
composition of the sample firms at both the associate and partnership
levels (see Tables 12a and 12b). Furthermore, the pattern of effects
for the various practice areas suggests that, especially at the partnership level, the racial composition of the sample firms tends to mimic
the racial composition of the firm's clients.

(illustrating effect of associate-partner ratio on women and minorities). This makes sense: firms
with high associate-partner ratios probably offer increased entry-level opportunities for women
and minority law graduates. The associate-partner ratio, however, has a significantly negative
effect on the proportion of Hispanic partners, and this significant negative effect is peculiar to
Hispanics. See supraTable 1lb (reporting effect ofassociate-partner ratio on Hispanics). Given
the other idiosyncratic findings regarding Hispanics, I conclude that the structure of the internal
promotion hierarchy affects the representation of Hispanic partners for idiosyncratic reasons.
225. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
226. Not one firm in the sample reports maintaining an international office in Africa. Most
of the international offices are located in Asia, Europe, Latin America, or Mexico.
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For example, although some areas of practice positively affect the
representation of all three racial groups,227 most of the effects are
group-specific. Thus, the presence of an administrative practice has
a significant positive effect on the representation of black lawyers but
negligible effects on the representation of Hispanic and Asian
American lawyers (see Tables 12a and 12b). Similarly, the presence
of an entertainment practice positively affects the representation of
black lawyers and Hispanic associates but negatively affects the
representation of Asian American lawyers (see Tables 12a and 12b).
Based on crude estimates of the racial composition of client groups,
the practice areas that most significantly affect each group tend to be
the practice areas offering the most clients and potential clients from
that group. Considering both associate and partner composition, the
areas of practice that have the strongest positive effect on the
representation of black lawyers are corporate, administrative,
commercial, and entertainment (see Tables 12a and 12b). Because
administrative lawyers tend to work with the federal government or its
lawyers, and entertainment lawyers tend to work with entertainers and
their agents, one explanation for this pattern is that administrative
and entertainment practices tend to offer relatively high proportions
of black clients.

227. The areas of practice that positively affect the representation of all three groups are
"foreign trade" and "government." See supra Tables 12a and 12b.
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Table 12a: Effects of Client Base (Associates)

Variable
Proportion Enrolled
Starting Salary
Chicago
Los Angeles
Washington, D.C.
Associate Growth
% Litigation
Corporate
Banking
Tax
Antitrust
Real Estate
Commercial
Government
Administrative
Labor/Employment
Foreign Trade
Entertainment
(Constant)
R2
R2 Change
F (R2 Change)
(n)

Proportion

Proportion

Female
Associates

Black
Associates

1.7389***
(17.101)
-. 0008
(-.635)
-. 0063
(-.801)
-. 0305***
(-3.530)
.0306**
(2.569)
-. 0002
(-1.001)
.0006*
(2.331)
-. 0142
(-1.899)
-. 0081
(-.877)
.0088
(1.084)
-. 0019
(-.160)
.0185*
(2.190)
.0149
(1.549)
.0199
(1.454)
.0160
(1.252)
.0225
(1.662)
.0638***
(-3.729)
-. 0630***
(-3.293)
-. 3729***
(-8.802)

.6004**
(2.760)
-. 0004
(-1.125)
.0058**
(2.707)
-. 0001
(-.027)
.0090**
(2.796)
-. 0000
(-.669)
-. 0000
(-.527)
.0055**
(2.706)
-. 0001
(-.041)
.0034
(1.535)
-. 0057
(-1.735)
-. 0038
(-1.669)
.0061*
(2.344)
.0070
(1.872)
.0090*
(2.605)
.0017
(.464)
.0022
(.468)
.0143**
(2.763)
-. 0138
(-1.185)

.7179***
(6.195)
-. 0009***
(-3.473)
-. 0002
(-.108)
.0106***
(6.173)
.0009
(.371)
-. 0001*
(-2.324)
.0002***
(3.251)
-. 0008
(-.526)
.0045**
(2.434)
.0010
(.603)
-. 0011
(-.469)
-. 0048**
(-2.866)
-. 0040*

.1065
.0454
3.2505***
(785)

.2284
.0718
5.9472***
(785)

.3533
.0531
5.2450***
(785)

***p < .001
* p <.05
**p <.01
Regression coefficients are unstandardized.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.

Proportion
Hispanic
Associates

(-2.078)
.0083**

(3.062)
-. 0031
(-1.205)
.0024
(.899)
.0130***
(3.824)
.0104**
(2.720)
-. 0190***
(-4.157)

Proportion
Asian American
Associates
.5649***
(5.170)
-. 0004
(-1.277)
-. 0086***
(-4.071)
.0127***

(5.558)
-. 0168***
(-5.324)
.0001
(1.293)
.0000
(.016)
-. 0054**
(-2.721)
.0022

(.902)
-. 0003
(-.139)
-. 0003
(-.088)
-. 0011
(-.199)
.0097***
(3.823)
.0036
(.987)
.0015
(.443)
-. 0129***
(-3.595)
.0217***
(4.788)
-. 0109*
(-2.151)
.0080
(1.891)
.2937
.1037
9.3860***
(785)

1997]

DETERMINANTS OF LAW FIRM INTEGRATION

733

Table 12b: Effects of Client Base (Partners)
Proportion
Female
Partners

Variable
Proportion Associates
Time
Starting Salary
Chicago
Los Angeles
Washington, D.C.
Partner Growth
% Litigation
Corporate
Banking

.1172***
(6.443)
.0069***
(13.755)
-. 0013*
(-1.929)
.0120**
(2.922)
.0267***
(6.078)
.0093
(1.536)
.0007**
(2.593)
.0004**
(3.116)
.0084*
(2.226)
-. 0004

(-.095)
Tax

.0097*
(2.369)
.0091
(1.485)
-. 0053
(-1.238)
.0043

Antitrust
Real Estate
Commercial

(.886)
Government
Administrative
Labor/Employment
Foreign Trade
Entertainment
(Constant)

R2
R2 Change
F (R2 Change)

.4436
.0373
4.2841***
(785)

(n)
* p <.05

-. 0014
(-.198)
.0091
(1.412)
.0030
(.447)
-. 0155
(-1.779)
.0047
(.486)
-. 5939***
(-14.694)

** p <.01

Proportion
Black
Partners

Proportion
Hispanic
Partners

Asian American
Partners

.0155
(.853)
.0004**
(3.394)
-.0001
(-.732)
.0040***
(3.624)
.0037**
(3.125)
-. 0002
(-.128)
.0000
(.465)
-. 0001*
(-2.035)
.0032**
(3.093)
.0037**
(2.985)
.0033**
(2.970)
.0018
(1.089)
-. 0008
(-.684)
.0060***
(4.587)
.0055**
(2.924)
.0128***
(7.296)
-. 0035
(-1.991)
.0063**
(2.701)
.0108***
(4.130)
-.0336***
(-3.355)

.0822**
(2.882)
.0002
(1.557)
.0010***
(4.555)
.0029*
(2.262)
.0060***
(4.331)
.0024
(1.290)
-. 0002*
(-1.951)
.0000
(1.149)
.0006
(.493)
-. 0034*
(-2.336)
-. 0026*
(-2.067)
-. 0024
(-1.272)
-. 0034**
(-2.520)
-.0019
(-1.230)
.0001
(.032)
.0008
(.416)
.0078***
(3.675)
.0084**
(3.116)
-. 0035
(-1.170)
-. 0169
(-1.438)

.0618**
(3.043)
.0005***
(4.526)
-. 0002
(-1.038)
-. 0038**
(-3.115)
.0024
(1.819)
-. 0019
(-1.055)
.0000
(.162)
.0001
(1.750)
.0023*
(2.050)
.0013
(.963)
.0031**
(2.569)
.0060***
(3.293)
.0084***
(6.681)
.0064***
(4.405)
.0033
(1.598)
.0019
(1.002)
-. 0015
(-.762)
.0090***
(3.473)
-. 0054
(-1.875)
-. 0541***
(-4.893)

.1765
.1161
9.0037***
(785)

.1611
.0630
4.7927***
(785)

.2020
.1041
8.3250***
(785)

*** p < .001

Regression coefficients are unstandardized.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Similarly, for Asian American lawyers, the most significant primary
practice areas are real estate, general commercial, and foreign trade
(see Tables 12a and 12b). Given the boom in foreign real estate
investment on the West Coast,228 this pattern suggests that Asian
American lawyers may be represented best in firms that handle
and commercial real estate transactions for Asian cliresidential
229
ents.
Even the findings for Hispanic lawyers support this interpretation.
At both the associate and partnership levels, the presence of an
international and foreign trade practice has a significant positive
effect on Hispanic representation, and the presence of a real estate
practice has a significant negative effect (see Tables 12a and 12b). In
addition, the presence of a foreign trade practice has a significant
positive effect on the proportion of Hispanic partners, whereas
banking, real estate, and entertainment practices all have significant
negative effects (see Table 12b). These findings tend to suggest that
Hispanic partners may be best represented in practice areas involving
foreign (perhaps Mexican or Latin American) clients23 ° and least
represented in practice areas with predominantly white, Asian
American, and black clients.
This "demographic" interpretation admittedly does not account for
all the practice area effects. It is difficult to explain according to
client composition why corporate, banking, and tax practices positively
affect the proportion of black partners; or why tax and antitrust
practices positively affect the proportion of Asian American partners.
The demographic interpretation also does not account for the
inconsistent effect of banking on Hispanic associates versus Hispanic
partners or the inconsistent effect of corporate practice on Asian
American associates versus partners.
However, a demographic interpretation of the practice area effects
is consistent with recent journalistic accounts describing the effect of
client demographics on the availability of advancement opportunities
for minority lawyers. 5 1 Such an interpretation also is consistent
with the demographic interpretation advanced above regarding the
228. See Teresa Watanabe, Japanese Make Themselves at Home in U.S. Residential Market, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1990, at D3 (explaining thatJapanese companies increasingly purchase real estate
in California).
229. When included in the client base model, the interaction of "real estate" and
"international branches" has a statistically significant positive effect on the proportion of Asian

American partners.
230. The presence of a labor and employment practice also positively affects the representation of Hispanic partners, although one can only guess how this might fit in. Labor union
representation in Chicago and Los Angeles?

231.

See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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effects of having an international office." 2 Firms whose primary
practice areas include foreign trade tend to have significantly higher
proportions of Hispanic and Asian American associates and significantly lower proportions of female associates (see Table 12a)-a
pattern that mirrors the effects of international diversification
(compare Table Ila).
In addition, a demographic interpretation of the practice area
effects is consistent with my interpretation of the positive effects of
departmentalization on the proportion of black partners. 23 If black
partners tend to be concentrated within particular practice areas, then
within firms, black partners may tend to be concentrated in the
departments corresponding to these practice areas.
Finally, it is difficult to think of an alternative explanation that is
more comprehensive. For instance, the effects of "public" practice
areas (such as government, administrative, and labor and employment) are consistently positive for all groups, which tends to support
the hypothesis that law firms with more public clients may be more
responsive to federal antidiscrimination law-and thus more integrated. 2' However, an interpretation based on firms' responsiveness to
federal law cannot explain the positive effects of international clients
on racial integration.
It could be that women and people of color tend to be concentrated in the least prestigious practice areas. The legal profession as a
whole is stratified primarily according to the type of client served.
Lawyers who serve organizational clients tend to make more money
and to have more status than lawyers who serve individuals;235 and
within the "organizational client" sector, the most prestigious fields of
practice are those associated with large corporate clients (such as
corporate and securities, and banking), rather than those associated
236
with labor organizations or government.
If the effects of practice area stemmed from variations in the
prestige of the field, however, the effect of each practice area should
be consistent with its prestige, and prestige effects should be
consistent across the four groups. Thus, women and people of color
should be least represented in practice areas such as corporate,
banking, and antitrust and best represented in areas such as government, labor, and general commercial practice. Instead, some of the

232. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
234. See Edelman, Symbolic Structures,supra note 13, at 1542.
235.

See HEINZ & IAUMANN, supra note 129, at 380.

236. See id.
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most prestigious practice areas have a positive effect on racial

integration; moreover, the effects of most areas are inconsistent across
groups (see Tables 12a and 12b).

Consequently, I conclude that the effects of the various practice
areas stem from the racial composition of associated client groups.
Law firms that practice in areas with higher proportions of black
clients tend to have higher proportions of black lawyers than law firms
practicing in other areas. 2 7

Similarly, law firms that practice in

areas with higher proportions of Hispanic and Asian American clients
tend to have higher proportions of lawyers from those groups2

Furthermore, my data suggest that, at least in the case of black and
Asian American partners, the nature of the firm's client base may be
more important than labor market conditions in determining the
level of organizational integration. For instance, in the case of black
partners, the inclusion of client base variables mediates the effects of
the internal labor supply. Compare the results in Table 12b with the
results for black partners in the model including labor market
controls only (see Table 9b). In the control model, the proportion
of black associates in the firm is a significant determinant of the
proportion of black partners in the firm; in the client base model, the
proportion of black associates is insignificant. The effect of being
located in Washington, D.C., also becomes insignificant for black
partners when the client base variables are included.
A similar result occurs for Asian American partners. Although the
effect of being located in Los Angeles is significantly positive in the
control model (see Table 9b), it no longer is significant when the
variables for client base are included (see Table 12b).
3.

Comparing the effects of structure and client base

As Table 13 indicates, primary practice areas are significantly
correlated with the structural characteristics of the firm. Practice
areas such as corporate, tax, and banking tend to be associated with
larger, more bureaucratized, more hierarchical, and more geographically diversified firms (see Table 13). In contrast, commercial and
administrative practices tend to be found in smaller, less bureaucratized, less hierarchical, and less diversified firms.

237. See supra note 227-30 and accompanying text (describing links between various practice
areas and level of racial integration within firms).
238. See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text (arguing that Hispanic and Asian
American attorneys may be best represented in practice areas that contain highest number of
Hispanic and Asian American clients).
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When both structural and client base variables are included in the
same model, however, their effects on the level of law firm integration
remain the same as those reported above (see Table 14). In general,
the most important organizational determinants of gender integration
are structural characteristics, and the most important determinants of
racial integration are client characteristics.
Table 14: Summary Statistics for Model Including Structural Variables
and Client Base Variables
Dependent Variable

Structural Variables

Client Base Variables

R2

F (R2 Change)

F (R2 Change)

.4007
.1466
.2662
.3533

6.3035***
2.4588*
4.0281***
6.8522***

5.3786***
3.9333***
6.2645***
11.3116**

.5231
.2540
.2626
.2415

14.4582***
8.0614***
13.6159***
7.3625***

5.4043***
10.3319***
5.0569***
9.4656***

Associate Composition
Proportion
Proportion
Proportion
Proportion

Female
Black
Hispanic
Asian American

Partner Composition
Proportion
Proportion
Proportion
Proportion
* p < .05

Female
Black
Hispanic
Asian American
** p < .01

*** p < .001
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IV. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
These results indicate that, even controlling for labor supply and
demand, law firm characteristics significantly affect the level of law
firm integration. The most important determinants of gender
integration are the structural characteristics of the firm such as the
length of the internal promotion hierarchy and the degree to which
the firm is geographically diversified. The most important determinant of racial integration is the racial composition of the firm's client
base.
These findings have important implications for employment
stratification theory and research, as well as for the future of gender
and race integration within law firms. First, my findings support
recent empirical work, which indicates that organizations play a
critical role in the perpetuation and alleviation of gender- and
race-based employment inequality." 9 The firms in my sample vary
significantly in their levels of gender and race integration, and much
of that variation is the result offirm-level-versus market-conditions.
These findings suggest that individual law firms (and firm leaders)
bear a substantial responsibility for determining the level of law firm
integration.
My research also extends previous work by illustrating the
group-specific consequences of various organizational characteristics.
Previous studies of organizational and occupational integration tend
to focus on either gender" or race, 241 or to draw no theoretical
My research suggests that the
distinction between the two. 24
dynamics of gender and race integration, to some extent, may be
theoretically distinct.
In particular, my findings suggest that, at least within elite law firms,
structural conditions such as the length of the partnership track are
a critical determinant of gender, but not racial, integration.
Structural conditions are especially important determinants of gender
integration at the partnership level. Similarly, the nature of the firm's
239. See, eg., Baron et al., supranote 18, at 1364 (proposing that organizational structures
and dynamics affect gender desegregation); Baron & Newman, For What It's Worth, supranote
12, at 172-73 (concluding thatjob positions and relevant markets are influenced by organizational politics); Bridges & Nelson, supra note 16, at 616-17 (positing theory explaining gender
inequality based on market and organizational factors).
240. See Baron et al., supra note 18, at 1362 (studying effect of organizational factors on
gender desegregation); see also Bridges & Nelson, supra note 16, at 616 (proposing marketorganizational relationship theory to explain gender segregation).
241. See Hammond, supranote 2, at 1.
242. See Baron & Newman, For What It's Worth, supranote 12, at 155-57 (focusing research
on women and racial minorities equally).
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client base is a critical determinant of racial, but not gender,
intregration. The nature of the firm's client base is even more
important than labor market conditions for determining racial
integration at the partnership level. These findings have important
implications for the future of gender and race integration within law
firms.
A.

Implicationsfor Gender Integration

My research suggests that the chief mechanism for increasing
gender integration within elite law firms is structural change.
Structural change may be especially important for increasing the level
of gender integration among partners.
Unfortunately, most evidence suggests that law firms are resistant
to structural change-particularly the implementation of part-time
employment policies, which many advocate as a means for accommodating lawyers with child care and other family responsibilities.243
Firms that do make part-time schedules available tend to do so on an
individual, ad-hoc basis,"' and lawyers who opt to work
part-time-even temporarily-typically are dropped from the
partnership track and suffer disproportionate economic penaliies.245
Some of the resistance to part-time employment may stem from the
relatively rigorous demands of large firm practice for lawyers
generally. As the interview data suggest, accommodations for one
lawyer may make other lawyersjealous and cause internal conflict and
resentment: "Partners share aggravation. And if somebody is going
to pass on all the aggravation that involves travel, staying late at night,
or giving up weekends, you've got the potential for a lot of resentment." (WFP2). As one partner explains:

243. See Few Attorneys Go Part-Time in '96, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 3, 1997, at 7
(reporting that only 2.6% of all lawyers surveyed worked part-time in 1996); Cynthia Fuchs
Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64
FORDHAM L.REv. 291,392-414 (1995) (reporting use and disuse of part-time policies in a sample
of eight New York law firms); Carol McHugh Sanders, Big-FirmPresenceof Women, MinoritiesMixed,
CHI. DAILY L. BuLL.,Jan. 14, 1997, at 2 (stating that percentage of lawyers working part-time is
far lower than percentage in other occupational groups).
244. See Epstein et al., supra note 243, at 395-401 (discussing prevalence of ad hoc versus
formal part-time policies).
245. SeeAbramson & Franklin, supranote 183, at 82 (noting that women find the option of
working part time to be infeasible in large firm context); Lisa Brennan, Women Still Lagging in
PartnerRanks But FindingWays to Break the Barriers,NJ. LJ., Apr. 24, 1995, at 1 (reporting that
women who opt for part-time and flex-time arrangements "rarely, if ever, regain the momentum
they need to make partner"); Maureen Castellano, Women Still Lagging in PartnerRanks, N.J. LJ.,
Apr. 24, 1995, at 1 (stating that partnership prospects become "particularly grim" for women
who takes advantage of part-time options); Epstein et al., supra note 243, at 395 (reporting that
all part-time associates in sample were taken off partnership track while working part-time).
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If you talk to young associates it is really extraordinary the number
of them who say.

.

. "Please God let them pay me $25,000 a year

less and let me work that much less, too." And I think the problem
is that people would gladly take the cut in pay in order to be able
to work less time. It's no punishment .... And so the problem
with the part-time policy ...

is that if you are going to make it

available at a big firm you are going to find all the associates...
want it. (WFP3).

Part of the resistance also may stem from an ideology of "professional commitment" that treats women's family responsibilities, in
particular, as suspect. The interview data suggest that women who
take time off to care for their children tend to be labelled "uncommitted," even when time taken off for other reasons would not be
considered inappropriate. As one female associate reports: "IfIwent
off to take care of my daughter for three hours, that was suspect...
[I]f my colleague went off for analysis, or to go to the health club,
that was just fine." (WFA1) Female lawyers may be perceived as
working less than they actually do, simply by virtue of the fact that
they have children. Consider the following account, from a female
partner in a large southern firm:
One of the things that a number of us [female partners] had
observed was that associate evaluation was just extremely [subjective] and sometimes [perceptions began] to be held about
associates very early in your career [and it is] very difficult for an
associate to do anything to change that perception ....

One

[incident] that really stands out in my mind in those days was, I
remember one partner saying about an associate one time, "She
doesn't work very hard," and so we went and got out the
hours-hours that were right at the top of the associates ....
(WFP4).
It is possible that as the proportion of female partners increases,
women will challenge this concept of "professional commitment." As
one female partner reports, women with children are beginning to
"come out of the closet" in elite law firms:
It's like coming out of the closet, and I think it is very important.
I have huge portraits of my son all over my office. When clients
come out for a good trial, they will be in the office wanting me to
work night and day, [but] I tell them I have to go home at six
o'clock to relieve the babysitter. And I say, "I can drop you off at
the hotel on my way home." It's interesting because the women
who-the very, very first woman to make partner... had children
but it was like a secret. No pictures in her office ...she was even
written up in the [trade magazine] that way [childless] ....
Now
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it is more out in the open, where it's, you know, "I'll be late to
work Monday, it's the first day of school .... ." (WFP4).

Some evidence indicates that both male and female lawyers increasingly are rebelling against the pressures of large firm practice, by
by their firms,246-or by
agitating for "lifestyle" accommodations
247
leaving large firm practice altogether.
It is not clear to what extent large law firms can afford to implement part-time policies and still remain competitive in their markets.
Some argue that the inherent demands of the work make part-time
employment economically inefficient for large law firms, at least at the
partnership level. 24 There is little actual evidence on this point,
however, and such claims may be more ideological than empirical. 249 What is clear is that without large-scale structural change, the
traditional organization of work in elite law firms that rewards long
hours and round-the-clock availability will continue to disadvantage
women disproprotionately and to serve as a barrier to gender integration.
B. Implicationsfor Racial Integration
The effects of client base on the racial composition of the sample
firms suggest that a chief mechanism for racial integration within elite
law firms is social similarity with clients. Thus, in order to achieve
better representation within elite law firms, people of color must
achieve better representation among elite firm clients. As one

246. See Claire Papanastasiou Rattigan, Kids & Work: A BalancingAc MASS. LAW. WKLY., Apr.
22, 1996, at BI (suggesting that men share women's concerns about the availability of alternative
work schedules within law firms); Leslie Rogers, Many Lauyers Seek Flexible Work Alternatives, IND.
LAW., May 1, 1996, at 15 (reporting that young lawyers increasingly are demanding alternatives

to law firms' traditional 80-hour work week).
247. See Castellano, supra note 245, at I (predicting that more and more women will "select
out" of large law firms to avoid the inevitable structural conflict between child rearing and large
firm practice).
248. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supranote 243, at 395,407 (reporting lawyers' opinions that parttime employment is incompatible with partnership); Firm Feedback on Part-TimeLawyering, MASS.
LAw. WKLY., Apr. 22, 1996, at B4 [hereinafter Firm Feedback] (reporting lawyers' claims that parttime practice is unworkable in some specialties). Law firms' demand for part-time work may be
better reflected in firms' increasing reliance on contract (temporary) lawyers hired firom outside
the firm. SeeSamuel A. Frederick, ControllingCompensation Costs by Using Temporay Attorneys, LAW
PRAC. MGMT.,July/Aug. 1995, at 34 (reporting that number of temporary lawyers increased from
1300 in 1988 to over 10,000 in 1996 and citing availability of speedy referral networks as key
factor in law firms' use of temporary lawyers); Melissa McKee Hackney, Some Large Phila. Firms
Embrace Contract Lawyers, THE LEGAL INTELUIGENCER, Apr. 15, 1996, at 3 (reporting increasing

use of contract lawyers in Philadelphia).
249. See irm Feedback, supra note 248, at B4 (reporting that "many partners believe lawyers
should be available around the clock" and suggesting that part-time lawyers, who "work more
...intensively without socializing... much during the day," may be disadvantaged when it
comes time for promotion); see alsoEpstein et al., supranote 243, at 403-06 (describing "stigma"
of part-time law practice).
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minority lawyer observed: "The bottom line is, minorities will only
stay on at large law firms if we are able to sustain ourselves economically, i.e., if we can bring in business."25
The identification of minority lawyers with minority clients may
itself become problematic, however, by increasing ethnic segmentation within the firms. As one black lawyer complains: "They expect
you to know every black politician in the city and every black
businessman in the state."251 Furthermore, minority lawyers who
serve independent client bases may opt to form their own firms rather
than work within larger, majority firms. 2
CONCLUSION

The future of gender and race integration within elite law firms is
unclear. Elite law firms may adjust to changes in their external labor
supply by incorporating part-time employees within the firm, for
instance, or by serving an increasingly diverse clientele. Alternatively,
elite law firms as we know them will fail to respond to supply-side
changes, and instead such changes will be reflected in the emergence
of alternative work organizations such as contract lawyer pools and
minority-owned firms.
Given that this is a story of incremental, organizational change and
the incremental, progressive effects of such change, perhaps it is
appropriate to conclude by quoting Baron, who suggests an "organizational" theory of integration:
We view job integration as the net result of a series of incremental
changes, involving new approaches to recruitment, selection, and
promotion; career development; andjob analysis and classification.
Organizations are pressured to effect these changes by external and
internal constituencies .... At the same time, not all organizations
are equally vulnerable or responsive to pressure ....
Moreover,
there are impediments to change .... From a theoretical and a
practical standpoint organizational practices and policies are crucial

250. Arnie Kanter, Some OtherOpinions on Minority Retention, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 26, 1990, at 21;
see also Michael Riccardi, Law Firm HiringDiversity: A "Client-Driven"Phenomenon,PA. LJ., Nov.

6, 1995, at 13 (suggesting that access to clients isa key factor in retaining minority lawyers within
large law firms).
251. Kanter, supranote 250, at 21; see supranote 199 and accompanying text.
252.

See Chris Klein, Minority Firm Battles as Political Tides Shift, NAT'L LJ., June 24, 1996, at

Al (discussing need to diversify partnerships in "majority" firms to respond to increasing
diversity among clients); LL.M.M.G., Minoriy-Owned Identity Can Be a Double-Edged Sword, ILL.
LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 1995, at 20 (discussing increasing competition posed by minority-owned firms
with specialized clienteles); supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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determinants of the rate at which ascription in the labor market is
reduced .... 2

253. Baron et al., supra note 18, at 1364, 1394 (concluding that organizational structures
affect gender desegregation).
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APPENDIX
List of Firms in Sample and 1989 Size Randng
CHICAGO (n=20)

Bake & McKenzie (1)
Bell, Boyd, & Lloyd (178)
Chapman and Cutler (98)
Gardner, Carton & Douglas (151)
Hopkins & Sutter (90)
Isham, Lincoln & Beale
Jenner & Block (75)
Katten, Muchin & Zavis (67)
Keck, Mahin & Cate (60)
Kirkland & Ellis (31)
Lord, Bissell & Brook (70)

Mayer, Brown & Platt (11)
McDermott, Will & Emery (15)
Ross & Hardies (215)
Rudnick & Wolfe (103)
Schiff Hardin & Waite (126)
Sidley & Austin (5)
Sonnenschein Carlin Nath &
Rosenthal (85)
William Brinks Olds Hofer Gilson &
Lione Ltd.
Winston & Strawn (33)

LOS ANGELES (n=25)
Adams, Duque & Hazeltine
Alschuler, Grossman & Pines
Buchalter, Nemer, Fields &
Younger (156)
De Castro, West, Chodorow &
Bums
Gendel, Raskoff, Shapiro &
Quittner
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (4)
Greenberg, Glusker, Fields,
Claman & Machtinger
Irell & Manella (157)
Kindel & Anderson
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